

Advancing Scalability in Decentralized Storage: A Novel Approach to Proof-of-Replication via Polynomial Evaluation

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Abstract

Proof-of-Replication (PoRep) plays a pivotal role in decentralized storage networks, serving as a mechanism to verify that provers consistently store retrievable copies of specific data. While PoRep’s utility is unquestionable, its implementation in large-scale systems, such as Filecoin, has been hindered by scalability challenges. Most existing PoRep schemes, such as Fisch’s (Eurocrypt 2019), face an escalating number of challenges and growing computational overhead as the number of stored files increases. This paper introduces a novel PoRep scheme distinctively tailored for expansive decentralized storage networks. At its core, our approach hinges on polynomial evaluation, diverging from the probabilistic checking prevalent in prior works. Remarkably, our design requires only a single challenge, irrespective of the number of files, ensuring both prover’s and verifier’s run-times remain manageable even as file counts soar. Our approach introduces a paradigm shift in PoRep designs, offering a blueprint for highly scalable and efficient decentralized storage solutions.

Keywords: proof of replication, proof of space, polynomial evaluation.

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1 Introduction

In recent years, there has been a significant shift in the domain of consensus mechanisms. Traditional proof-of-work (PoW) systems [44, 33], though revolutionary in their own right, have been scrutinized for their significant energy consumption and potential centralization due to ASIC dominance. As a result, the cryptographic community has been driven to explore alternative methods that could provide similar security guarantees without the associated ecological or centralization concerns [30, 11, 30, 50, 6, 27, 25, 19].

Proof-of-Space (PoS) [30, 11] emerged as a compelling alternative to proof-of-work, with applications ranging from spam prevention and DDoS attack resistance to Sybil-resistant blockchain consensus protocols. The appeal of PoS lies in its eco-friendly nature and resistance to ASIC dominance. By leveraging storage space instead of consuming massive energy, PoS offers a more egalitarian and sustainable solution compared to PoW.

Proof-of-Replication (PoRep) extends the concept of PoS by requiring the prover to store useful replicated data that can also be retrieved by the verifier. In a PoS protocol, the prover demonstrates to a verifier that it is dedicating a minimum amount of storage space, but the stored data can be arbitrary. In contrast, a PoRep scheme verifies that the prover is persistently storing *retrievable* copies of a *specific* data file or dataset. While a PoS only proves the size of storage used, a PoRep provides stronger guarantees that the prover is dedicating unique storage resources per replica of the data. PoRep has the useful side effect of providing decentralized and verifiable file storage, unlike PoS which wastes the dedicated space. PoRep can be conceptualized as a fusion of (1) PoS with application-specific beneficial data, and (2) the robust guarantees of Proof of Data Possession (PDP) [12] and Proof of Retrievability (PoR) [38], ensuring not only the existence but also the retrievability of stored data replicas.

This practicality and robustness of PoRep make it especially attractive for real-world applications. One notable implementation is Filecoin [1], a decentralized storage network built on top of the Interplanetary File System (IPFS). Filecoin not only capitalizes on the concept of PoRep but elevates it as a foundational pillar. In the Filecoin ecosystem, storage providers are incentivized through the native cryptocurrency, FIL, to reliably store users' files. To prove their reliability and earn these rewards, providers are *audited*: they must demonstrate through PoRep that they are consistently storing retrievable replicas of client data by answering a series of *challenges*. This ensures that data is not merely stored but is also readily available for retrieval, aligning with Filecoin's vision of offering a more efficient, decentralized, and resilient alternative to traditional data storage methods.

However, as the decentralized storage vision of Filecoin materializes, certain requirements emerge as paramount:

1. *Laconic challenges*: An efficient PoS and PoRep would necessitate compact challenges, ideally of constant size.
2. *Sublinear prover and verifier*: To ensure longevity and efficiency, the prover's query complexity on its local storage (or replica) should be minimized, preventing wear and tear from frequent audits [2]. Also, verification should be efficient to make these scheme applicable in large scale systems.
3. *Robust space gap*: To ensure maximal security and data fidelity, the gap between data deletion and its detection during audits must be minimized.

Fisch [31] introduces a novel construction of tight PoRep rooted in graph labeling, targeting an asymptotic proof size of $O(\log N/\eta)$, where η represents the space gap (i.e., the difference between the amount of space the prover claims to be using and the actual space they are using).

Central to this, is the mechanism of *stacked Depth Robust Graphs (DRGs)*, wherein multiple fixed-degree DRGs are systematically layered. Such an arrangement is designed to ensure that a slight perturbation in one layer’s data triggers a cascading recomputation in the preceding layers. The inherent interplay between the number of DRG layers and the degree of each graph directly impacts the efficacy of the construction. A potential imbalance in this delicate equation could lead to surging proof complexities, a considerable impediment, especially when accommodating arbitrary values of η . In an alternative model, Fisch [31] proposes the *ZigZag Expander DRGs*. By amalgamating each DRG layer with a non-bipartite expander graph of constant degree and intertwining their dependencies in a “zig-zag” fashion, this design promises more streamlined data extraction. However, it calls for doubling the layer count to maintain analogous security guarantees, a compromise that might not be universally optimal.

In the context of systems like Filecoin, where vast numbers of files are stored, the methodology introduced by Fisch may encounter scalability challenges. Specifically, as the number of files escalates, the computational overhead inherent to the PoRep mechanism of [31] becomes increasingly pronounced, making it potentially expensive in terms of both challenge generation and runtime efficiency for provers and verifiers.

This poses the question:

How can we develop a PoRep scheme that retains the security and robustness of prior models, yet offers improved scalability and efficiency suitable for large-scale decentralized storage networks?

Our primary objective is to design an optimized PoRep scheme for large-scale decentralized storage networks, addressing the shortcomings of existing models. PoRep schemes have two stages: a one-time *offline* stage and a repeated *auditing* stage. Our main target for efficiency improvement is the *latter*. Our goals include enhanced computational efficiency, improved challenge-response mechanisms, and a reduced space gap. Central to our approach is an auditing technique for proofs of space, anchored in polynomial evaluation. This ensures the prover’s efficiency stays sublinear, notably poly-logarithmic relative to the file size. To achieve this, we employ sophisticated polynomial evaluation methods with polynomial pre-processing, a technique detailed in [40]. This pre-processing phase yields a data structure that ensures poly-logarithmic run-times for both provers and verifiers, allowing for a fast auditing phase.

In Table 1, we showcase the performance of the state-of-the-art protocol [31] based on the criteria listed above.

For a single file, our scheme’s performance might align with, or slightly lag behind, Fisch’s design as presented in [31]. This is partly due to the overheads associated with our polynomial evaluations and pre-processing. However, our distinct advantage lies in our challenge mechanism: irrespective of the number of files, our polynomial-based encoding consistently demands only one challenge. As the file count grows, this feature becomes increasingly beneficial. In contrast, Fisch’s design sees its number of challenges rise in direct proportion to the number of files. This inherent trait means that both the prover’s and verifier’s run-times in Fisch’s approach grow quadratically as more files are added (see Table 1). It is important to note that our method, while benefiting from a data structure tailored for univariate polynomial evaluation, does introduce an “expansion factor” which increases the data footprint. Yet, this mild growth in data might be a reasonable trade-off for the significant computational gains it offers, particularly in extensive systems like Filecoin where processing speed often takes precedence over storage size. In addition, this factor is adjustable; it can be fine-tuned according to the prover’s specific requirements, providing flexibility within the PoRep construction.

Table 1: This table contrasts our PoRep with [31] based on replication (i.e., memory guarantee). Here, $u \geq 1$ represents file count, $|m| = N = d \cdot z$ denotes each file’s bit size, with d as block count and z as each block’s bit size. We use $O_\lambda(f(\cdot))$ to symbolize $O(f(\cdot) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda))$. Columns 2-4 relate the challenge count to the malicious prover’s required memory n (in bits) for verification. Column 5 depicts prover and verifier run-times and proof size relative to challenge count (auditing phase), while Column 6 presents the factor γ which modifies memory for the honest prover (i.e., memory used is $u \cdot N \cdot \gamma$). The 4th column’s (η) -gap, defined as $(1 - \eta)u \cdot N = n$, denotes the difference between file size $u \cdot N$ and adversary’s memory bound; a smaller gap indicates a better memory guarantee. Rows one and two (labeled “general statement”) outline the construction’s security. The table’s final two rows, set by $|q| = \lambda$ and $z = \lambda^{1+\delta}$ (for any constant $\delta > 0$), contrast replication assurances for a specified malicious prover memory-bound (Column 3). Colored cells emphasize optimal parameters.

Scheme	# Challenges	Adv.’s memory n in bits	(η) -gap where $\eta \in [0, 1]$	Prover’s/Verifier’s run-time and proof size	Honest prover’s memory (γ) -expansion
[31] (general statement)	$1/\eta$ (of size $\log(d)$)	$u(N - \eta \cdot N)$	any $\eta \in [0, 1]$ (η can depend on d and u)	$O_\lambda(u/\eta \cdot \log d)$	$O(1)$
Ours § 6.1 (general statement)	1 (element from $\mathbb{Z}_q$)	$u \cdot N - d \cdot q - \lambda$	$(d \cdot q - \lambda) / (u \cdot N)$	$O_\lambda(u \cdot \text{polylog}(d))$	$O_\lambda(\sqrt[3]{d})$ (for arbitrary constant $c \geq 1$)
[31]	$O(u \cdot \lambda^{\delta_1})$ (of size $\log(d)$)	$u \cdot N - (d + 1)\lambda$	$O((u \cdot \lambda^\delta)^{-1})$	$O_\lambda(u^2 \cdot \log d)$	$O(1)$
Ours § 6.1	1 (of size λ)	$u \cdot N - (d + 1)\lambda$	$O((u \cdot \lambda^\delta)^{-1})$	$O_\lambda(u \cdot \text{polylog}(d))$	$O_\lambda(\sqrt[3]{d})$ (for arbitrary constant $c \geq 1$)

1.1 Our Contributions

Our primary contribution lies in designing an optimized Proof-of-Replication (PoRep) scheme tailored for large-scale decentralized storage networks. Our main objective is to improve the efficiency of the auditing phase of PoRep, i.e., provers compute proofs over time to demonstrate memory usage and the correct storage of files. By centering our methodology around polynomial evaluation, we ensure that as file sizes grow, our prover’s efficiency remains consistent and manageable. Key benefits of our system include: reduced computation during auditing, a streamlined challenge-response mechanism, and a reduced space gap. Our methodology presents significant benefits—particularly as the number of files grows—improving on prior work like Fisch’s [31], where challenges increase proportionally with file count. To realize this, we have found new solutions that tackle the limitations of current PoRep models:

- We introduce a novel auditing mechanism rooted in polynomial evaluation. This technique streamlines the proof verification process, especially beneficial for expansive datasets. Our core method involves encoding a message m —after appropriately “combining” it with its identifier id —into a polynomial $f(X)$ that appears random. We can then check the correct storage of u messages $m_1, \dots, m_u$ by generating a single challenge x and requesting the prover to compute $y_1 = f_1(x), \dots, y_u = f_u(x)$ where $f_i(x)$ is the polynomial (encoding) generated from the i -th identifier id_i and i -th message m_i . Drawing inspiration from the work of Ateniese et al. [14], we demonstrate that this strategy forces a prover to keep $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)$ (the encoding of the messages) stored in “almost” their entirety (i.e., the memory required to compute the correct evaluations $\{y_i\}_{i \in [u]}$ is approximately $|f_1(X)| + \dots + |f_u(X)|$). This allows our system to operate with just a single challenge, regardless of the number of files, providing a notable advantage in scalability (see Sections 3.5, 6 and 6.1).
- Building on Kedlaya and Umans [40], we have developed a method to achieve poly-

logarithmic prover’s running time for polynomial evaluation in decentralized storage networks. By using a RAM data structure, polynomial evaluations are expedited, reducing time complexities (see [Section 5](#)). This structure, however, enlarges memory by a multiplicative factor γ , which can be adjusted based on prover requirements. This balances efficient computation time with manageable memory overhead, making polynomial evaluations more efficient in our PoRep scheme.

- To achieve efficient PoRep verification, we leverage localized RAM computation, ensuring both the prover’s and verifier’s tasks remain poly-logarithmic in complexity. By using Merkle trees on top of our data structure, a verifier can check the integrity of a prover’s computation without having full access to the prover’s data structure. While this approach emphasizes the auditing phase, it is crucial to ensure honest generation of the root digest, which can be reinforced using a SNARK proof during the encoding phase. Our resulting authenticated data structure (see [Section 5.1](#)) for polynomial evaluation is of independent interest: it can be seen as a *succinct polynomial commitment*—a key component of SNARKs—where *opening algorithm is poly-logarithmic in the degree of the polynomial*. This construction—which achieves this property trading additional storage—is to the best of our knowledge the first of its type. All the other constructions we are aware of require linear proving time (an incomplete list includes the works [\[39, 46, 41\]](#)).

Additionally, we offer a **modular description** for PoRep schemes, utilizing abstractions like verifiable data structures and memory-hard functions. Unlike previous, more rigid frameworks, our approach clearly delineates the interchangeable components, facilitating the creation of variants with distinct attributes.

1.2 Technical Overview

Given the intricate nature of our solution, we provide a high-level overview of our PoRep construction. It achieves laconic challenges, efficient proving and verification complexity (efficient auditing), and a robust space gap (i.e., high memory guarantees) as the number of files u increases. For clarity, we focus on enforcing memory usage (the replication property), sidelining extractability. Note that extraction arises from polynomial interpolation; messages/files are encoded into polynomials, enabling extraction via interpolating multiple evaluations.

Initially, we detail the syntax and security guarantees of PoRep. Then, we outline our single-file approach (case $u = 1$). Towards the end, we delve into handling multiple files (case $u \geq 1$) and draw comparisons with Fisch’s PoRep [\[31\]](#). We assume all messages consist of d blocks of size $|p| = \log(p)$, where p is a prime in our construction; thus, $|m| = d \cdot |p|$.

Syntax and Security of PoRep Schemes. A PoRep scheme allows encoding highly *compressible* messages (e.g., a file) into *incompressible* strings that represent the messages. These schemes consist of five algorithms: **Setup**, **Encode**, **Prove**, **Verify**, and **Decode**. The setup algorithm generates three *public keys*: an encoding key ek , a proving key pk , and a verification key vk . Each key is used during a specific phase of the PoRep scheme. The **Encode** algorithm computes the incompressible encoding of a message m . Given the encoding key ek , a message m , and an identifier id for m , it outputs an encoding c and a digest h for later verification.¹ After encoding (and the publication of the digest h), the auditing phase begins. This phase involves the execution of **Prove** (on the prover’s side) and **Verify** (on the verifier’s side). This

¹An identifier is a value used to salt encodings, i.e., different encodings $c_1 \neq c_2$ of identical messages $m_1 = m_2$ can be produced by using different identifiers $id_1 \neq id_2$. This is fundamental in PoRep schemes to enforce a high memory usage even when messages are maliciously chosen.

phase primarily ensures the prover stores the encoding c . Specifically, given a random challenge chall , the prover runs $\text{Prove}(\text{pk}, \text{chall}, c)$ to produce a proof π that verifies the storage of c . The Prove algorithm is executed several times for auditing the correct storage of the encoding c and the main objective of this work is to reduce the complexity of this phase. On the verifier’s side, using the same challenge chall and proof π , the verifier runs $\text{Verify}(\text{vk}, \text{h}, \text{chall}, \pi)$ (where h is associated with the prover’s encoding) to ensure the prover passed the auditing phase. Lastly, the Decode algorithm, when provided the encoding key ek , inverts an encoding c to retrieve the original message. Decode is executed by the prover when is asked to return the message m encoded by c .

Informally, a PoRep must ensure: (i) the prover utilizes significant memory and (ii) encoded messages are retrievable. These properties are termed *replication* and *extraction*.² For a single message (denoted by $u = 1$), PoRep’s replication represents the minimum memory n a prover must use to pass verification. When $u > 1$, the replication concept remains, but a prover must produce u verification proofs, and n can vary based on the number of messages $u > 1$. Higher values of n indicate better replication. Additionally, we aim to enforce a memory usage of size n that scales with the number of files u . Such enforcement necessitates limiting the prover’s runtime, a common trait in PoRep schemes [31]. Given the trapdoorless nature of our PoRep (no secret keys), certain constraints emerge. For instance, in a decentralized setting like blockchains, a message m (chosen by the prover) can be highly compressible. Each block of $m = (F(k, 1), F(k, 2), \dots)$ is generated by evaluating a PRF $F(k, \cdot)$, where $k \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ is a short key. To compute a proof π , the prover can regenerate blocks of m as needed. This approach uses minimal memory since the sizes of ek , pk , id , and k aren’t related to the message’s size. Thus, our PoRep employs a “slow” Encode algorithm. Its speed is adjustable using the time parameter t chosen during Setup , restricting the adversary to producing proofs more quickly than the execution time of Encode .

Conversely, PoRep’s extraction property ensures all u messages are retrievable when a prover, holding the encodings, passes the verification phase for any number of files u . We present our definitions in Section 6.

Enforcing Space through Polynomial Evaluation. Our starting point is the work of Ateniese et al. [14], which leverages the evaluation of a random polynomial to build verifiable capacity-bound functions, a specific type of space-based primitive. Let $\mathbb{Z}_p$ be a field of order p from which the coefficients of the polynomial are sampled, and let $\mathbb{Z}_q \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_p$ be the subset $\{0, 1, \dots, q-1\}$ from which evaluation points are sampled. At a high level, [14] examines a setting where a (possibly malicious) evaluator receives a randomly sampled polynomial $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ of degree $d-1$, preprocesses $f(X)$ to compute a memory α smaller than $|f(X)|$ (i.e., by compressing $f(X)$ or pre-computing and storing some evaluations of $f(X)$ on some adversarially chosen points $(x_1, x_2, \dots)$), and then attempts to compute $y = f(x)$ on a randomly chosen point $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ using only α (and not $f(X)$). The work in [14] formally shows that the evaluator’s memory α cannot be smaller than $|\alpha| \approx d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|$ where $|p|$ is the size of a coefficient and $|q|$ is the size of the challenge point.³ Since one of PoRep’s objectives is to maximize memory usage, we need to set (i) a large enough challenge space (e.g., $|q| = \omega(\log(\lambda))$) to guarantee security and, (ii) $q \ll p$ (e.g., $|q|$ is sublinear in $|p|$) so that $|\alpha|$ is maximized (high memory usage) and close to the size of $f(X)$ (which is $|f(X)| = d \cdot |p|$). Hence, by properly setting the parameters, we are guaranteed that evaluating $f(X)$ requires memory close to $|f(X)|$. See Section 3.5 for more details.

²The replication property corresponds to PoS (proof-of-space) in [31].

³To be precise, the memory size is $|\alpha| = d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q| - \lambda$. We ignore the loss λ and we write $|\alpha| \approx d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|$ for clarity.

This result forms the core idea of our PoReps. The encoding c of a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^{d \cdot |p|}$ (comprising d blocks each of size $|p|$) concerning an identifier id (i.e., the execution of $\text{Encode}(ek, m, id)$) involves combining id and m to derive a polynomial $f(X)$ that appears randomly sampled from $\mathbb{Z}_p[X]$. We achieve this by calculating $f(X) = H(v, id) \oplus m$ (interpreting each block of $H(v, id) \oplus m$ as a coefficient of $f(X)$) where H is a random oracle (RO) and $v = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(id)$ is the output of a memory-hard function (MHF) (denoted by Eval_{MHF}) that remains secure against input-dependent pre-processing. This type of MHF abstracts functions that are “slow” to compute in the presence of an adversary that conserves storage by omitting some of the labels needed for output computation. An example of such functions are those based on either stacked DRG or ZigZag Expander DRG proposed by Fisch [31], which informally ensure that an adversary, omitting some labels associated with the last layer of the underlying DRG, will face a high sequential runtime to compute the correct output $v = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(id)$.⁴

Using this method, we determine that an evaluator utilizing memory of size at most $|\alpha| = n \approx \min\{n_{\text{MHF}}, d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|\}$ (where $n \approx d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|$ is the memory-bound provided by $f(X)$ and n_{MHF} is the one offered by the MHF) cannot compute $f(x)$ (on a randomly sampled x) in parallel time t_{MHF} where t_{MHF} is the time-bound offered by the MHF, dependent on n_{MHF} . This stems from the security guarantees of polynomial evaluation and MHF described earlier.⁵ Setting $n_{\text{MHF}} \gtrsim d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|$ (achievable by adjusting settings on the graph of [31] such as the number of layers and nodes per layer of the underlying DRG), results in $|\alpha| = n \approx d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|$, close to $d \cdot |p| = |m|$ when $q \ll p$. Thus, requesting $y = f(x)$ will necessitate the evaluator to use memory $|\alpha| \approx |m|$ when restricted to a runtime shorter than t_{MHF} .

We stress that the slow encoding algorithm Encode (which corresponds to the MHF running time t_{MHF}) is a necessary security feature (as in [31]) since PoRep is a trapdoor-less primitive. A fast encoding would allow an adversary to store the original, possibly highly compressible, message m (e.g., $m = 0^n$) and quickly regenerate the encoded form on demand when challenged during the audit phase. Thus, without a delay t_{MHF} , the PoRep could not guarantee any minimum memory usage since the original message are maliciously chosen and, thus, can be highly compressible. Therefore, restricting the prover for proof generation in less than time t_{MHF} is fundamental and makes on-the-fly re-encoding impossible during audit.

Though the above solution enforces significant space usage on the prover’s side, which is essential for the PoReps’ replication property, it presents the following challenges:

1. *How can the prover efficiently compute $y = f(x)$ to achieve sublinear prover’s runtime?*
Currently, evaluating the polynomial takes time linear in d (i.e., the number of coefficients).
2. *How can the verifier efficiently check that $y \stackrel{?}{=} f(x)$?* In other words, how can we make the above scheme verifiable in sublinear time?

We discuss solutions to these problems in the subsequent paragraphs.

Achieving poly-logarithmic prover’s running time. As described in the previous paragraph, our approach asks a (possibly malicious) prover to compute $f(x)$ on a randomly sampled point in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ where $f(X) = m \oplus H(\text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(id), id)$. To decrease the prover’s running time, we need to make the evaluation of a polynomial efficient. Several works [40, 43, 10, 17, 20, 54, 55, 37, 45, 35] have proposed different techniques to enable fast polynomial evaluation. This led to the work of Kedlaya and Umans [40] which proposed a RAM data structure D that allows

⁴Following our abstraction, $v = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(id)$ concatenates the random oracle labels associated with the last layer of the DRG as defined in [31].

⁵This requires selecting the minimum memory-bound $|\alpha| = n \approx \min\{n_{\text{MHF}}, d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|\}$ provided by the two to ensure both hold simultaneously.

computing $f(x)$ (for any $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$) in time poly-logarithmic in the number of coefficients d of the polynomial $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ (recall that the number of coefficients d corresponds to the number of blocks of the encoded message). Formally, [40] shows the existence of an algorithm **GenData** that, on input $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and p , outputs a data structure D . Then, an evaluator can execute $\text{Eval}(x, D)$ (i.e., Eval leverages the RAM access to D to read some blocks from D) to compute $y = f(x)$ in time $\text{poly}(\log(d), |p|)$.

We note that, to achieve a $\text{poly}(\log(d), |p|)$ evaluation time, the data structure D (output by **GenData**) is larger than the size of $f(X)$, since $f(X)$ is pre-computed and manipulated. In particular, the D of [40] has a multiplicative overhead which we term (γ) -expansion, meaning the size of D is $|f(X)| \cdot \gamma$ (D is γ times larger than the size of the original polynomial). Specifically, the (γ) -expansion of [40] is $\gamma = \sqrt[c]{d} \cdot \log^{o(1)}(p)$ for any arbitrary constant $c > 1$. Thus, the running time of an honest prover can be made poly-logarithmic in d by increasing its memory by a multiplicative factor $\gamma = \sqrt[c]{d} \cdot \log^{o(1)}(p)$, which is sublinear in $|f(X)|$. On the bright side, the factor $\sqrt[c]{d}$ (of the expansion γ) can be made arbitrarily small by selecting a larger constant $c > 1$. This parameter can be chosen by the prover according to its needs: c can be dynamically increased or decreased as it is not fixed by the PoRep construction.

Poly-logarithmic verification through localized RAM computation. Until now, the technique we have described relies on requiring the prover (who stores m) to evaluate a polynomial $f(X)$, where $f(X) = m \oplus H(\text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{id}), \text{id})$ represents an encoding of m with respect to the identifier id and random oracle H , on a randomly chosen point $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. As noted at the beginning of this section, evaluating $f(X)$ suffices to verify that the prover is utilizing a memory α of size $|\alpha| \approx d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|$, which is approximately $d \cdot |p| = |m|$ when $|q| \ll |p|$. The remaining challenge is to enable a verifier to ascertain that $y \stackrel{?}{=} f(x)$.⁶

At first glance, one might assume that poly-logarithmic verification could be integrated using standard techniques for verifying computations, such as SNARKs. For instance, we could employ a SNARK (which permits efficient verification) to have the prover generate a proof π that demonstrates $y = f(x)$. Specifically, this could be achieved by validating that y was honestly computed using the data structure D (retained by the prover) outlined in the previous paragraph. However, this strategy is flawed because it would result in the prover's running time becoming linear in the size of the data structure D . Generating a proof with SNARKs demands time linear to the size of the witness (of the required relation), which corresponds to the data structure D . This would nullify the advantages gained by employing the efficient data structure.

Our solution to verification capitalizes on the observation that we target the same poly-logarithmic (in d) complexity for both the prover and the verifier. It might therefore be adequate for a verifier to replicate the prover's computation and verify that the derived result $f(x) = y'$ matches y , the value produced by the prover. A significant obstacle in implementing this strategy is that the verifier lacks access to D . To address this, we utilize Merkle trees (or any vector commitment) atop D . Specifically, the data structure $D = (D_1, \dots, D_\ell)$ is segmented into ℓ blocks, and h represents the root of the corresponding Merkle tree (with the tree's height being $\log(\ell)$). We recognize that, during the computation of y , the prover will access at most a poly-logarithmic number of blocks $D' \subset D$ from $D = (D_1, \dots, D_\ell)$ (recalling that D is a RAM data structure), making its running time poly-logarithmic in d . For verification, the prover merely needs to transmit y , the accessed blocks D' , and the associated $|D'|$ Merkle tree openings $(\pi'_1, \dots, \pi'_{|D'|})$. Thus, a verifier possessing the digest h can:

1. Using the openings $(\pi'_1, \dots, \pi'_{|D'|})$, verify that the received blocks D' align with the blocks

⁶If the verifier cannot validate $y \stackrel{?}{=} f(x)$, a prover could bypass the verification without using any memory by simply outputting a malicious $\tilde{y} \neq f(x)$.

of D .

2. Compute $y' = f(x)$ by running the evaluation algorithm `Eval` of the data structure solely with the received blocks D' .
3. Validate that $y' \stackrel{?}{=} y$, where y is the evaluation returned by the prover.

The ensuing verification process ensures the prover’s running time remains poly-logarithmic in d while facilitating poly-logarithmic verification. We emphasize that h must be computed honestly to guarantee the soundness of the above verification procedure. Although this paper’s contribution centers on the auditing phase, we implicitly presume that h is generated with integrity. Nonetheless, we stress that the integrity of h (furnished by the prover) can be assured by incorporating a SNARK proof during the encoding phase conducted by the prover. This doesn’t impact the paper’s conclusions since we don’t set a specific limit on the running time of `Encode` (i.e., the SNARK proof is computed and output by `Encode`).⁷ We present our verifiable data structure in [Section 5](#).

We term the act of conducting an accurate RAM computation using only the blocks involved in the computation (as performed by our verification algorithm) as “localized RAM computation”. A thorough analysis is presented in [Section 4](#), where we demonstrate that every RAM algorithm possesses its corresponding localized version, with the runtime being identical up to a logarithmic factor. While the foundational concept may appear straightforward, the formal proof is nuanced. For a comprehensive overview, we direct readers to [Section 4](#).

Lastly, we highlight that our verifiable data structure (described above) is of independent interest: it can be seen as a *succinct polynomial commitment (based on collision resistant hash functions) where opening algorithm is poly-logarithmic in the degree of the polynomial*.

Multiple files and comparison with Fisch’s PoRep [31]. In the case of multiple messages or files (when $u > 1$), a prover must provide u verifying proofs to pass the auditing. As previously discussed, when a single message is stored, our PoRep ensures that a prover utilizes at least $n \approx d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|$ memory to pass the verification. Using a hybrid argument, we can assert that the memory requirement when $u \geq 1$ must be at least $n \approx u(d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|)$. A limitation of this memory-bound n is that the loss increases with the number of stored files. Specifically, if a prover can save 1 GB with $u = 1$, then the same prover can save up to u GB when $u > 1$. This is naturally an undesirable outcome. A pertinent question arises: *can we mitigate such a loss, potentially making it independent of the number of messages u ?*

We demonstrate that, in contrast to [31], this is achievable by expanding the analysis on the memory needed to evaluate a random polynomial (as outlined at the beginning of this section) to consider the case where $u > 1$ for polynomial evaluations. Our findings (presented in [Section 3.5](#)) indicate that when evaluating u random polynomials $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)$ at the *exact same* point $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ (i.e., the consistent PoRep’s challenge), the memory required for the evaluation must be at least $|\alpha| = n \approx u \cdot d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|$, approximating $u \cdot |m|$ when $q \ll p$. Consequently, polynomial evaluations enable our PoRep scheme to *amortize* the memory loss when multiple polynomials are evaluated.

By integrating this insight with the method introduced at the start of this section, we derive a PoRep scheme that compels a malicious evaluator operating in a time frame shorter than t_{MHF} (as defined by the underlying MHF) to allocate at least $n \approx u \cdot |m|$ memory to pass the auditing phase (i.e., computing u verifying proofs). The sole prerequisite is encoding the u messages $m_1, \dots, m_u$ into u distinct random polynomials. Given that messages can be chosen

⁷Applying a SNARK at encoding time, replication can be ensured even under malicious executions of `Encode`. This approach is employed in practice by Filecoin [1].

with malice (e.g., they could all be identical), a unique identifier id_i for each m_i is mandatory. This is the sole alteration necessary to achieve the stated bound.

Regarding Fisch’s PoRep construction [31], we note that, for $\eta \in [0, 1]$, the challenge count needed is $O(1/\eta)$ when the prover employs memory of size $|m| - \eta \cdot |m|$ (refer to Table 1). The memory-bound exhibits a loss that scales linearly with the message count u , meaning the challenge count must be $O(1/\eta)$ when $u \cdot |m| - u \cdot \eta \cdot |m|$. Hence, to ensure a loss independent of u , η must be inversely proportional to u , e.g., $\eta = \frac{1}{u} \cdot \eta'$ for some other $\eta' \in [0, 1]$. Nevertheless, this directly influences the challenge count of [31], causing it to rise linearly with the file count u , leading to a challenge count of $O(1/\eta) = O(u/\eta')$. This, in turn, affects the prover’s operational time, making it quadratic in terms of message count, necessitating the prover to compute u proofs, each containing u openings.

Conversely, our PoRep demands a singular challenge (a point x), while achieving a memory-bound of $n \approx u \cdot |m|$, and a prover’s operational time of $u \cdot \text{poly}(\log(d), \log(p))$. For a juxtaposition between our approach and Fisch’s PoRep security, we direct readers to Table 1.

On setting the parameters. As previously outlined, our scheme achieves a memory bound of $|\alpha| = n \approx \min\{n_{\text{MHF}}, u \cdot d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|\}$, where n_{MHF} represents the memory required for encoding (attributable to the use of the MHF), and $u \geq 1$ denotes the number of files stored. To optimize the benefits from our polynomial evaluation technique, it is crucial to set $n_{\text{MHF}} \gtrsim u \cdot d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|$, thereby aligning the memory bound of our PoRep with $n \approx u \cdot d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|$ as enforced by polynomial evaluation. It becomes evident that this necessitates an a-priori bound, u_{max} , on the number u of files the adversary can store (see Corollary 6).⁸

Still, we demonstrate that if the memory required by the underlying MHF scales linearly with the number of evaluations (a condition met by Fisch’s construction [31]), then our technique can be adapted to support an arbitrary number of files. More formally, if the computation of $\text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{id}_1), \dots, \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{id}_u)$ necessitates memory proportional to $u \cdot n_{\text{MHF}}$, our PoRep technique imposes a memory usage of $|\alpha| = n \approx \min\{u \cdot n_{\text{MHF}}, u \cdot d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|\}$. Consequently, by setting $n_{\text{MHF}} \geq d \cdot |p|$, we eliminate the prerequisite for a predefined bound on file numbers, achieving $n \approx u \cdot d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|$ (see Corollary 7).

To accommodate an unlimited file count, slight modifications to the encoding syntax (i.e., encoding the u files concurrently via $\text{Encode}(\text{ek}, (m_i, \text{id}_i)_{i \in [u]}) = (c_i, h_i)_{i \in [u]}$) and the use of the RO are anticipated. Therefore, we detail the unbounded construction separately.⁹ We refer the reader to Section 6.1 for more details about our constructions. We stress that our second unbounded construction achieves the exact same security of the bounded one (reported in Table 1) except that u is unbounded.

On the role of the Random Oracle. A principal contribution of this work is introducing a first-of-its-kind modular (black-box) approach for constructing PoReps, necessitating a RO H to convert the output from the (input-dependent preprocessing) MHF into a random polynomial. In essence, H serves as a “glue” that integrates our black-box components seamlessly. We explore eliminating the RO H by examining the MHF’s internal mechanics. For instance, using the MHF from [31]’s encoding phase shows that its last pebbled graph layer (function output) has maximal entropy (randomness) due to RO computation. This randomness enables direct computation of the random polynomial, e.g., $f_i(X) = m_i \oplus \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{id}_i)$. Additionally, our modular framework mandates incorporating id_i within the RO input, thus computing the polynomial as $f_i(X) =$

⁸Achievable by ensuring $n_{\text{MHF}} \gtrsim u_{\text{max}} \cdot d \cdot |p| - d \cdot |q|$.

⁹For the unbounded model, the i -th file m_i is encoded as $f_i(X) = m_i \oplus H(v_1, \dots, v_u, \text{id}_i)$ (replacing $H(v_i, \text{id}_i)$), where $v_j = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{id}_j)$ for $j \in [u]$.

$m_i \oplus H(\text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{id}_i), \text{id}_i)$, rather than $f_i(X) = m_i \oplus H(\text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{id}_i))$, to ensure accurate RO programming during the proof of security.

2 Related Work

Proof-of-Space (PoS) protocols ensure provers allocate specific memory amounts, emphasizing efficient verification and communication. Some approaches, such as pebbling-based methods, use directed acyclic graphs to enhance space guarantees [30, 11, 4, 50, 6, 18]. Proof-of-Replication (PoRep) confirms that storage providers genuinely replicate data, preventing them from storing unrelated content [48, 32, 26, 8, 24, 42, 47, 36, 23, 31]. Beyond PoS and PoRep, various other cryptographic storage mechanisms also play crucial roles. Below, we discuss several notable examples, highlighting their relevance and contributions.¹⁰

Proof of Data Possession (PDP): PDP schemes are fundamental in cryptographic storage, allowing a storage provider to prove to clients that their outsourced data remains intact and available. While they achieve the space-hardness goal of PoS for large, incompressible data, they often involve significant communication costs, especially during the initial data transfer [12, 15, 52, 34, 9].

Proof of Retrievability (PoR): PoR protocols enable clients to ensure the integrity and retrievability of their stored files on a server. Equipped with an extractor, these protocols allow for the reconstruction of the file from the provided proofs [38, 51, 28, 21].

Memory-Hard Functions (MHF): These are functions designed to require considerable memory/space for computation, primarily aimed at constructing ASIC-resistant proofs-of-work. While they demand continuous CPU utilization, their distinction from PoS is their ability to keep provers offline while still utilizing space-time [5, 7, 16, 3].

Proof of Secure Erasure (PoSE): This protocol ensures a prover’s ability to confirm the erasure of specific memory portions. When integrated with PoS, it offers a holistic solution to secure storage and subsequent data erasure [4].

Proof of Transient Space (PoTS) and Proof of Persistent Space (PoPS): These protocols emphasize the temporal aspect of storage, with PoPS focusing on ensuring provers allocate space over time, verified through periodic audits. When integrated with PDP or PoR, they underline the prover’s commitment to storage over extended periods [13, 49, 22].

3 Preliminaries

3.1 Notation

Bold capital letters (such as $\mathbf{X}$) are used to denote random variables, small letters (such as x) to denote concrete values, calligraphic letters (such as $\mathcal{X}$) to denote sets, serif letters (such as A) to denote algorithms. For a string $x \in \{0,1\}^*$, we let $|x|$ be its length; if $\mathcal{X}$ is a set, $|\mathcal{X}|$ represents the cardinality of $\mathcal{X}$. When x is chosen uniformly from a set $\mathcal{X}$, we write $x \leftarrow \$ \mathcal{X}$. We use $\mathbf{U}_n$ to denote the uniform distribution over $\{0,1\}^n$. For an arbitrary distribution $\mathbf{X}$ (e.g., non-uniform) over a set $\mathcal{X}$, we write $x \leftarrow \$ \mathbf{X}$ the act of sampling x from $\mathcal{X}$ according to the distribution $\mathbf{X}$. If A is a deterministic algorithm, we write $y = A(x)$ to denote a run of A on input x and output y ; if A is randomized, we write $y \leftarrow \$ A(x)$ (or $y = A(x; r)$) to denote a run of A on input x and (uniform) randomness r , and output y . An algorithm A is *probabilistic polynomial-time* (PPT) if A is randomized and for any input $x, r \in \{0,1\}^*$ the computation of $A(x; r)$ terminates in a polynomial number of steps (in the input size).

¹⁰For a comprehensive overview, see <https://proofofspace.org>.

3.2 Memory-Hard Function with Input-dependent Pre-processing

A memory-hard function (MHF) with input space $\mathcal{X}$ and output space $\mathcal{Y}$ consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

Setup($1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n$): On input the security parameter 1^λ , the time parameter 1^t , and the memory parameter 1^n , the randomized setup algorithm outputs the public parameter pp .

Eval(pp, x): On input the public parameters pp and an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$, the deterministic evaluation algorithm outputs $y \in \mathcal{Y}$.

We are interested in secure MHFs even in the presence of input-dependent pre-processing. Informally, such a flavor of MHF guarantees that it is infeasible to compute $y = \text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x)$ (for a random input $x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$) in parallel time complexity σ (chosen on setup) with $O(\text{poly}(t))$ processors (i.e., the computation of $y = \text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x)$ is non-parallelizable). This must hold even if the adversary pre-processes the MHF by producing a string α of size n (i.e., the memory parameter chosen on setup) conditioned to the challenged input x .

Definition 1 (Input-dependent pre-processing security of MHF). *Let $\sigma(\lambda, t, n) = \sigma$ be a polynomial function that depends on the security parameter λ , the time parameter t , and the memory parameter n . An MHF scheme $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Eval})$ with input space $\mathcal{X}$ and output space $\mathcal{Y}$ is (ϵ, σ, n) -secure if for every valid PPT adversary $A = (A_1, A_2)$, we have*

$$\mathbb{P}[\text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x) = A_2(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n, \text{pp}, x, \alpha) \wedge |\alpha| \leq n] \leq \epsilon$$

where $\text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n)$, $x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$, $\alpha \leftarrow A_1(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n, \text{pp}, x)$.

An adversary $A = (A_1, A_2)$ is called valid if A_2 runs in parallel time σ with $\text{poly}(t)$ processors.

Definition 1 establishes that computing $\text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x)$ within parallel time σ necessitates adversary memory exceeding n , applicable to singular evaluations. Additionally, our focus extends to a more robust class of MHFs that demonstrate linear memory scaling with the evaluation count. Specifically, if a single evaluation mandates memory n , then processing u inputs requires memory $u \cdot n$.

Definition 2 (Input-dependent pre-processing multi-instance security of MHF). *Let $\sigma(\lambda, t, n) = \sigma$ be a polynomial function that depends on the security parameter λ , time parameter t , the memory parameter n , and the number of evaluations u . A MHF scheme $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Eval})$ with message space $\mathcal{X}$ and output space $\mathcal{Y}$ is (ϵ, σ, n) -multi-instance-secure if for every valid PPT adversary $A = (A_1, A_2)$, for every $u \in \mathbb{N}$, then*

$$\mathbb{P}[(v_1, \dots, v_u) = A_2(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n, \text{pp}, (x_1, \dots, x_u), \alpha) \wedge |\alpha| \leq u \cdot n] \leq \epsilon,^{11}$$

where $\text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n)$, $(x_1, \dots, x_u) \leftarrow \mathcal{X}^u$, $\alpha \leftarrow A_1(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n, \text{pp}, (x_i)_{i \in [u]})$, and $v_i = \text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x_i)$ for $i \in [u]$.

An adversary $A = (A_1, A_2)$ is called valid if A_2 runs in parallel time σ with $\text{poly}(t)$ processors.

Remark 1 (On the output length of MHF with input-dependent pre-processing). *In [Definition 1](#), the auxiliary information α of size at most n (e.g., the memory state) can depend on the challenge input $x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$. This implies that the output $y = \text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x)$ must be incompressible; that is, it is infeasible to compress y (in polynomial time) into a string of size at most n . Otherwise, A_1 could simply compute $y = \text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x)$ and output α , which is the compression of y . In*

¹¹The probability upper-bound ϵ can depend on the number of evaluations u .

this way, the second adversary A_2 could simply decompress α to recompute y , possibly bypassing the non-parallelizable computation enforced by the MHF scheme. This is analogous to the DRG constructions of [31], where the output is set to the labels of the last layers of the DRG, and an adversary can delete a fraction of those labels. This also applies to the multi-instance notion in Definition 2.

Fisch [31] presents a construction of a *stacked depth-robust graph (DRG)*. The last layer in the “stack” contains the sinks of the graph. All nodes in the graph are labeled. Each of these labels is computed as a random oracle applied to the labels of the node’s parents. The results in [31] can then be interpreted as: any adversary storing less than 80% of the sinks will need to perform a $\Omega(\ell)$ sequential computation where ℓ is the number of blocks of the last layer. This allows us to instantiate Corollary 1 as follows. We define the evaluation of our MHF as the computation of the labels of the sinks in the graph. The labels of the source nodes are defined in terms of x , the input to the evaluation function. The setup of our MHF corresponds to the topology of the graph.

This construction meets the criteria of both Definition 1 and the multi-instance variant of security (Definition 2). Indeed, [31] heavily relies on random oracles. Hence, multiple evaluations (on u randomly sampled inputs $(x_1, \dots, x_u)$) will be completely independent due to the underlying random oracle. The following corollary reports the security guarantee of [31].

Corollary 1. *There exists a $(\text{negl}(\lambda), \Omega(\ell), 0.8 \cdot \ell \cdot z)$ -secure (resp. -multi-instance-secure) MHF with input space $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$ in the parallel random oracle model (parallel ROM), where ℓ is the number of blocks (each of size $z \in \omega(\log(\lambda))$) of the last layer of the DRG.¹²*

3.3 Vector Commitments and Merkle Trees

A vector commitment (VC) scheme with message space $\mathcal{M}$ is composed of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

Setup(1^λ): On input the security parameter 1^λ , the randomized setup algorithm outputs the public parameters pp .

Commit($\text{pp}, (m_1, \dots, m_\ell)$): On input the public parameters pp and a sequence of ℓ messages $(m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \in \mathcal{M}^\ell$, the deterministic commit algorithm outputs a commitment c and an auxiliary information aux .

Open($\text{pp}, m, i, \text{aux}$): On input the public parameters pp , a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, an index $i \in [\ell]$, and an auxiliary information aux , the deterministic open algorithm outputs a proof π .

Verify(pp, c, m, i, π): On input the public parameters pp , a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and index $i \in [\ell]$, and a proof π , the deterministic verification algorithm outputs a decision bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

A VC scheme must satisfy the standard definitions of (perfect) correctness and position binding. Moreover, we focus on VC schemes where the running times of both **Open** and **Verify** are polylogarithmic in ℓ in the RAM model of computation.

Definition 3 (Efficiency of VC). *A VC scheme $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open}, \text{Verify})$ with message space $\mathcal{M}$ is efficient if both the open algorithm **Open** and the verification algorithm **Verify** have (worst-case) running time $\text{poly}(\lambda, \log(\ell))$ where ℓ is the vector length parameter given as input to **Setup**. The running times of both **Open** and **Verify** are measured in the RAM model of computation.*

¹²The parallel time complexity of A_2 corresponds to the number of parallel random oracle (parallel RO) queries submitted by A_2 .

Definition 4 (Perfect correctness of VC). A VC scheme $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open}, \text{Verify})$ with message space $\mathcal{M}$ is perfectly correct if $\forall \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \forall \ell \in \mathbb{N}, \forall (m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \in \mathcal{M}^\ell, \forall i \in [\ell]$, the following probability holds:

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{pp} \leftarrow \$ \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), \\ \text{Verify}(\text{pp}, \text{c}, m_i, i, \pi) = 1 : \begin{array}{l} (\text{c}, \text{aux}) = \text{Commit}(\text{pp}, (m_1, \dots, m_\ell)), \\ \pi = \text{Open}(\text{pp}, m_i, i, \text{aux}) \end{array} \end{array} \right] = 1$$

Definition 5 (Position binding of VC). A VC scheme $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open}, \text{Verify})$ with message space $\mathcal{M}$ satisfies (ϵ) -position binding if for every PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, we have:

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{Verify}(\text{pp}, \text{c}, m, i, \pi) = 1 \wedge \\ \text{Verify}(\text{pp}, \text{c}, m', i, \pi') = 1 \wedge \\ m \neq m' \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} \text{pp} \leftarrow \$ \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), \\ (\text{c}, m, m', i, \pi, \pi') \leftarrow \$ \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \text{pp}) \end{array} \right] \leq \epsilon$$

Merkles tree (implemented using collision-resistance hash functions) are efficient VCs.¹³ Below, we report the formal corollary.

Corollary 2. Assuming a collision-resistant hash function, there exists a $(\text{negl}(\lambda))$ -position binding and efficient VC scheme with message space $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^z$ (for any $z \geq 1$) and efficiency as defined in [Definition 3](#). Moreover, we have that $|\text{c}| = \lambda$ (i.e., commitments are succinct) and $|\text{aux}| = \ell \cdot z$.

3.4 Efficient Data Structure for Univariate Polynomial Evaluation

Next, we introduce the notion of data structures (DS) for univariate polynomial evaluation. At a high level, $\mathcal{D}$ is a DS for univariate polynomial evaluation if there exists a RAM algorithm that, given a point x , reads some blocks from $\mathcal{D}$ (using its RAM access to $\mathcal{D}$) to compute $f(x)$ where $f(X) = \sum_{i=0}^d a_i \cdot X^i \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ is the univariate polynomial taken into account.

More formally, let p be a prime and $\mathbb{Z}_p$ be a field. A (possibly efficient) data structure (DS) for evaluation of univariate polynomials is composed of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

GenData(f, p): On input a univariate polynomial $f(X) = \sum_{i=0}^d a_i \cdot X^i \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ (of degree $d \in \mathbb{N}$) and a prime $p \in \mathbb{N}$, the deterministic data structure generation algorithm outputs a data structure $\mathcal{D}$.

Eval($x, \mathcal{D}$): On input a point $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and the data structure $\mathcal{D}$, the deterministic evaluation algorithm outputs $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$.

Intuitively, correctness says that, for every prime $p \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and for every $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$, and for every $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, the evaluation algorithm $\text{Eval}(x, \mathcal{D})$ correctly computes $f(x)$ when $\mathcal{D} = \text{GenData}(f, p)$.

Definition 6 (Perfect correctness of DS). A DS $\Pi = (\text{GenData}, \text{Eval})$ for evaluation of univariate polynomials is perfectly correct if $\forall$ prime $p \in \mathbb{N}$, $\forall f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X], \forall x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, the following probability hold:

$$\mathbb{P}[f(x) = \text{Eval}(x, \text{GenData}(f, p))] = 1.$$

¹³In Merkle trees, the auxiliary information aux (output by Commit) corresponds to the intermediate hashes of the tree. Hence, computing the opening π (for some $m_i \in \mathcal{M}$ at position i) requires time $\lambda \cdot \log(\ell) + \log(|\mathcal{M}|)$ in the RAM model of computation since the evaluator needs to read $\log(\ell)$ intermediate hashes (from aux) each of size λ and a leaf (i.e., the sibling message of m_i) of size $\log(|\mathcal{M}|)$.

Naturally, a trivial DS D corresponds to the coefficients of $f(X)$: evaluating $f(x)$ requires reading the d coefficients $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ from D . In this paper, we are interested in DS for univariate polynomial evaluation with non-trivial efficiency, i.e., the computation of $f(x)$ requires time $\text{poly}(\log(d), \log(p))$ where p and d are the prime and the degree of the univariate polynomial $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ given in input to **GenData**. We highlight that in order to obtain poly-logarithmic (or any sublinear) evaluation time, the data structure generation algorithm **GenData** may need to pre-process $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. Hence, the data structure D (output by **GenData**) may be bigger than $|f(X)| = (d+1) \cdot \log(p)$ where $\log(p)$ is the bit size of a coefficient $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. For this reason, the following definition of efficiency is parametrized by $\gamma = \frac{|D|}{|f(X)|}$. Throughout the paper, we refer to γ as the expansion factor of DS. The formal definition follows.

Definition 7 (Efficiency with (γ) -expansion of DS). *A DS $\Pi = (\text{GenData}, \text{Eval})$ for evaluation of univariate polynomials is efficient with (γ) -expansion if the following conditions hold:*

(γ) -expansion: *The size of D (output by $\text{GenData}(f, p)$) is bounded by $|f(X)| \cdot \gamma = (d+1) \log(p) \cdot \gamma$ where d is the degree of $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ and $\log(p)$ is the size of a coefficient $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ of $f(X)$. The expansion parameter γ may depend on the degree d of $f(X)$ and the bit length $\log(p)$ of p .*

Efficient evaluation: *The evaluation algorithm **Eval** has (worst-case) running time $\text{poly}(\log(d), \log(p))$ where d is the degree of $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ and $\log(p)$ is the size of a coefficient $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ of $f(X)$ (recall that $f(X)$ and p are given as input to **GenData**). The running time of **Eval** is measured in the RAM model of computation.*

Kedlaya and Umans [40] have proposed an efficient DS for univariate polynomial evaluation with an expansion factor $\gamma = O(d^\delta \cdot \log^{o(1)}(p))$ where δ is an arbitrary positive constant. Below, we report the efficiency of their construction.

Corollary 3 ([40, Section 5] restated). *For every positive constant $\delta > 0$, there exists an efficient DS for univariate polynomial evaluation with (γ) -expansion (Definition 7) defined as $\gamma = (d+1)^\delta \log^{o(1)}(p)$, where $\log(p)$ and d are the size of the prime p and the degree of $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, respectively.¹⁴*

For completeness, we stress that the parameter δ of Corollary 3 affects both the size of the data structure and the running time of the data structure's evaluation algorithm. Concretely, the smaller the δ , the slower the evaluation. However, it also leads to a smaller data structure size (smaller γ). In other words, a small δ corresponds to less pre-computation, which in turn slows down the evaluation. Still, asymptotically speaking, [40, Section 5] demonstrated that any constant $\delta > 0$ is sufficient to achieve poly-logarithmic evaluation complexity which is sufficient for the scope of this work.

3.5 Incompressibility and Polynomial Evaluation

Next, we define the notion of incompressibility (w.r.t. distributions), which determines how much a string x , sampled from a distribution $\mathbf{X}$, can be compressed.

Definition 8 (Incompressibility). *Let $\mathbf{X}$ be a distribution defined over $\{0, 1\}^n$. We say that $\mathbf{X}$ is (c, ϵ) -incompressible if for every unbounded adversary $A = (A_1, A_2)$, we have*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[A_2(1^\lambda, \alpha) = x \wedge |\alpha| \leq n - c : x \leftarrow \mathbf{X}_\lambda, \alpha \leftarrow A_1(1^\lambda, x) \right] \leq \epsilon.$$

¹⁴Observe that the expansion factor γ of $(d+1)^\delta \log^{o(1)}(p)$ implies that the overall size of D (output by **GenData**(f, p)) is at most $(d+1)^{1+\delta} \log^{1+o(1)}(p)$. This follows by observing that $|D| = |f(X)| \cdot \gamma = (d+1) \log(p) (d+1)^\delta \log^{o(1)}(p) = (d+1)^{1+\delta} \log^{1+o(1)}(p)$.

Observe that the above definition considers adversaries with unbounded computation. It is known that the uniform distribution $\mathbf{U}_n$ over $\{0, 1\}^n$ is $(c, \frac{1}{2^c})$ -incompressible with respect to unbounded adversaries.

Theorem 1. *For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and for every $c \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $c \leq n$, the uniform distribution $\mathbf{U}_n$ over $\{0, 1\}^n$ is $(c, \frac{1}{2^c})$ -incompressible.*

We extend the above theorem to the setting of polynomial evaluation. In particular, we demonstrate that a randomly sampled polynomial $f(X) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ cannot be compressed in the following sense: *to compute $f(x)$ at a randomly sampled point x with sufficiently large probability, an adversary must have access to a sufficiently large string α (which encodes $f(X)$ or some pre-computed evaluations of $f(X)$).* Intuitively, this follows by observing that $d + 1$ evaluations $(f(x_1), \dots, f(x_{d+1}))$ and their corresponding points $(x_1, \dots, x_{d+1})$ are an encoding of the random string $a = (a_0, \dots, a_d)$ composed of the $d + 1$ coefficients of the polynomial $f(X) = \sum_{i=0}^d a_i \cdot X^i$.¹⁵ This allows us to reduce the incompressibility of random polynomials to the incompressibility of random strings (Theorem 1). Below, we present the formal result whose proof appears in Appendix A.1. Also, we highlight that an analogous result has been demonstrated in [14, Section 3], but in a different setting, yielding a different bound.

Theorem 2. *Let p be a $(s_p + 1)$ -bit prime and q be a (s_q) -bit prime where $q \leq p$. For every $u \in \mathbb{N}$, let $\mathbf{F}_{d-1,p}^u$ be a distribution (over the set of univariate polynomials of degree $d - 1$ from $\mathbb{Z}_p[X]$) which samples u polynomials $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ as follows:*

- *Sample $(a_0, \dots, a_{u \cdot d - 1}) \leftarrow \mathbf{U}_{u \cdot d \cdot s_p}$ and return the u univariate polynomials $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)$ such that $f_j(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} a_{j \cdot d + i} \cdot X^i \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ of degree $d - 1$ for $j \in \{0\} \cup [u - 1]$ (i.e., each a_i is interpreted as an element of $\mathbb{Z}_p$).*

For every $u \in \mathbb{N}$, for every $d \in \mathbb{N}$, for every $c \leq d(u \cdot s_p - s_q)$ and for every unbounded adversary $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2)$, the following probability holds:

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{A}_2(1^\lambda, x, \alpha) = (f_1(x), \dots, f_u(x)) \wedge \\ |\alpha| \leq d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} (f_i(X))_{i \in [u]} \leftarrow \mathbf{F}_{d-1,p}^u \\ \alpha \leftarrow \mathbf{A}_1(1^\lambda, f_1, \dots, f_u), \\ x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \end{array} \right] \leq \frac{d-1}{|\mathbb{Z}_q|} + \frac{1}{2^c}.$$

On the best possible (asymptotic) security guarantees of Theorem 2. Fix $u = 1$ in Theorem 2. We observe that the bound of $|\alpha|$ presents a loss proportional to $d \cdot s_q$, which depends on the size of the (single) polynomial (i.e., the degree d).¹⁶ This loss exactly corresponds to the length of d points from $\mathbb{Z}_q \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_p$. Intuitively, this is because the adversary $\mathbf{A}_1$ can compute α such that it will later allow $\mathbf{A}_2$ to answer correctly only to some adversarially chosen points that may be correlated to the random polynomial $f(X) \leftarrow \mathbf{F}_{d-1,p}^1$ (this is because $\mathbf{A}_1$ computes α while knowing $f(X)$).¹⁷ The reason behind this loss is also discussed in [14, Sec. 3].

In addition, we notice that the best possible security guarantee offered by Theorem 2 is when the adversarial advantage is small and the upper bound of $|\alpha|$ is maximized (note that the upper bound on $|\alpha|$ cannot go beyond $d \cdot u \cdot s_p$). In this way, we are guaranteed that the

¹⁵From $(f(x_1), \dots, f(x_{d+1}))$ and $(x_1, \dots, x_{d+1})$ it is possible to reconstruct $a = (a_0, \dots, a_d)$ through Lagrange interpolation.

¹⁶For the sake of clarity, we ignore c that does not depend on either d or u .

¹⁷By looking at the proof of Theorem 2, this loss is due to the need to encode $(x_1, \dots, x_d)$ (which may be arbitrary and correlated to $f(X)$) in the string α output by the reduction. These points $(x_1, \dots, x_d)$ are essentially the ones on which the adversary $\mathbf{A}_2$ correctly computes $(f(x_1), \dots, f(x_d))$. This is required in order to allow the reduction to correctly reconstruct $a = (a_0, \dots, a_{d-1})$ and contradict the $(c, \frac{1}{2^c})$ -incompressibility of $\mathbf{U}_{d \cdot s_p}$ (recall we are assuming that $u = 1$).

adversary does not win even when it has access to a large amount of pre-computed information (i.e., the string α). To this end, we choose to state [Theorem 2](#) while taking into account that s_q (which defines the size of the (challenge) point space $\mathbb{Z}_q \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_p$) can be both (i) significantly smaller than s_p (which defines the size of a coefficient of the polynomials) to get a reasonably high upper bound on $|\alpha|$, and (ii) large enough to get a significantly small (possibly negligible) upper bound on the adversary's advantage.

The following corollary shows that this is possible asymptotically. In particular, we can set the upper bound of the adversary's advantage to be exponentially small in λ while keeping the bound on $|\alpha|$ asymptotically close to the optimal value $u \cdot d \cdot s_p$ (i.e., the best possible security that can be achieved) by setting $s_p = s_p(\lambda) = \lambda^{1+\delta}$ (where δ is a positive constant) and $s_q = s_q(\lambda) = \lambda$. Below, we present the formal corollary whose proof is in [Appendix A.2](#).

Corollary 4. *For every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for every $u = u(\lambda) \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$, for every $d = d(\lambda) \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$, for every $(\lambda^{1+\delta} + 1)$ -bit prime p where $\delta > 0$ is a constant, and for every (λ) -bits prime q (note that $q < p$ by definition), we have*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\begin{array}{l} A_2(1^\lambda, x, \alpha) = (f_1(x), \dots, f_u(x)) \wedge \\ |\alpha| \leq d \cdot u \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta} - (d+1) \cdot \lambda \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} (f_i(X))_{i \in [u]} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{F}_{d-1,p}^u, \\ \alpha \xleftarrow{\$} A_1(1^\lambda, f_1, \dots, f_u), \\ x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q \end{array} \right] \leq O\left(\frac{1}{2^\lambda}\right).$$

We stress that there are other combinations of parameters for s_p and s_q that allow for a negligible adversarial advantage. For example, it is sufficient to set $s_q \in \omega(\log(\lambda))$ and $s_p = \lambda$. However, these choices do not allow us to set the adversary's advantage to be exponentially small in λ as achieved in [Corollary 4](#). Thus, we choose $s_q = s_q(\lambda) = \lambda$ and $s_p = s_p(\lambda) = \lambda^{1+\delta}$ to set the advantage to be at most $O\left(\frac{1}{2^\lambda}\right)$ while getting an upper bound on $|\alpha|$ which is asymptotically close to $d \cdot u \cdot s_p$ (i.e., the best possible security that can be achieved).

3.6 Pseudorandom Functions

A pseudorandom function (PRF) scheme $\Pi = (\text{KGen}, \text{F})$ with input space $\mathcal{X}$ and output space $\mathcal{Y}$ is composed of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

KGen(1^λ): The randomized key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a key $\mathbf{k}$.

F($\mathbf{k}, x$): The deterministic function evaluation algorithm takes as input a key $\mathbf{k}$ and an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$, it outputs a value $y \in \mathcal{Y}$.

A PRF Π is considered secure (i.e., pseudorandom) if its output distribution is indistinguishable from the one of a truly random function.

Definition 9 (Security of PRF). *A PRF Π with input space $\mathcal{X}$ and output space $\mathcal{Y}$ is (ϵ) -secure if for every PPT adversary $\mathbf{A}$, we have:*

$$\left| \mathbb{P} \left[\mathbf{A}^{\text{F}(\mathbf{k}, \cdot)}(1^\lambda) = 1 \right] - \mathbb{P} \left[\mathbf{A}^{\text{F}_{\text{rnd}}(\cdot)}(1^\lambda) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \epsilon,$$

where $\mathbf{k} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ and $\text{F}_{\text{rnd}} : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ is a truly random function over $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{Y}$.

4 Localized (deterministic) RAM algorithms

Consider an input $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ composed of n blocks where each x_i can be accessed in constant time in the RAM model of computation. Also, consider a RAM algorithm $\mathbf{T}$ with

RAM access to x that, on input $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$,¹⁸ performs a computation, reading only a subset $\mathcal{X} \subset \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ of the blocks of x . In this section, we formally demonstrate that the exact same computation can be executed with only y and the blocks $\mathcal{X}$ effectively read by T (i.e., the unread blocks are unnecessary) when T is deterministic.¹⁹ To this end, we start by introducing the oracle notation for RAM algorithms, which will allow us to formally demonstrate the above statement.

Oracle Notation for Deterministic algorithms in the RAM model of computation.

We focus *only* on deterministic RAM algorithms. Let x be a *RAM accessible* input composed of multiple blocks $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$. We denote with $T^{[x]}$ a RAM algorithm T with *read-only* RAM access to x . Moreover, let $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$ be an arbitrary binary string. We denote with $T^{[x]}(y)$ the deterministic execution of a RAM algorithm T with read-only RAM access to x but not to y , i.e., T must read y in its entirety. Below, we formally define how T interacts with its RAM accessible input.

Definition 10 (Oracle abstraction for deterministic RAM algorithms). *A deterministic RAM algorithm T is an algorithm that performs computations by leveraging its RAM access to (some of) its inputs. Let $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ be a read-only RAM accessible input x composed of n blocks and $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$ be an arbitrary binary input string. The execution $T^{[x]}(y)$ performs computations over x and y where T can read parts of x by interacting with the oracle $[x]$ as follows: T can send a (read, i) read command (for $i \in [n]$) to $[x]$. As a result, T receives the i -th block x_i from $[x]$.*

Definition 11 (Indexes read during a RAM computation). *Let T be a deterministic RAM algorithm, $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ be a read-only RAM accessible input x composed of n blocks and $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$ be an arbitrary binary input string. We say that $\mathcal{I}_{x,y} \subseteq [n]$ is the ordered set of indexes read from x during the computation $T^{[x]}(y)$ if the following conditions hold:*

Completeness: *Let $(\text{read}, i_1), \dots, (\text{read}, i_{n'})$ be the read commands submitted by T to $[x]$ during the RAM computation $T^{[x]}(y)$ (note that n' may be greater than n since T can read a block multiple times). Then, we have that $i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ for every $j \in [n']$ where $\mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ is a set (i.e., no duplicate indexes).*

Ordering: *The set $\mathcal{I}_{x,y} = \{i_1, \dots, i_k\}$ is ordered, i.e., $\forall j \in [k-1]$ we have $i_j < i_{j+1}$ where $i_j, i_{j+1} \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$.*

Localized (deterministic) RAM algorithms. The fact that the deterministic RAM computation $T^{[x]}(y)$ computes output v by only reading the indexes $\mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ of the input $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ implies that it is possible to compute v (in the RAM model) even without the blocks $(x_i)_{i \in [n] \setminus \mathcal{I}_{x,y}}$ where $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$. To this end, we define the notion of a *localized RAM algorithm*. Intuitively, the localized version Local.T of the deterministic RAM algorithm T is, in turn, a deterministic RAM algorithm that is able to recompute the output of $T^{[x]}(y)$ by taking as input the string y and the blocks $x_{i_1}, \dots, x_{i_k}$ read by $T^{[x]}(y)$ from x .

Somewhat more formally, if $T^{[x]}(y) = v$ then $\text{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y) = v$, where $\mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ is the ordered set of indexes read from x during the computation $T^{[x]}(y)$ and $x' = (x'_1, \dots, x'_k) = (x_{i_1}, \dots, x_{i_k})$ is a read-only RAM accessible input. We note that the localized algorithm Local.T has access to an additional read-only RAM accessible input map which is essentially the memory mapping

¹⁸In this section, it is sufficient to interpret y as an arbitrary binary string that needs to be read in its entirety, i.e., RAM access to y does not give any benefit to T .

¹⁹Otherwise, the final output and the blocks read from x may also depend on the random coins of T .

between $x' = (x'_1, \dots, x'_{k'})$ and $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$. In particular, **map** is defined as $\text{map} = (i_j)_{i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}}$ and is required to let $\text{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)$ know that its j -th block x'_j of x' corresponds to the i_j -th block x_{i_j} of x (held by the original computation $\text{T}^{[x]}(y)$).²⁰ We formalize the notion of localized RAM algorithms below.

Definition 12 (Localized RAM algorithms). *We say that a deterministic RAM algorithm Local.T is the localized version of the deterministic RAM algorithm T if the following conditions hold:*

Perfect correctness: *For every read-only RAM accessible input $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$, for every arbitrary binary input $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$, let $\mathcal{I}_{x,y} = \{i_1, \dots, i_k\}$ be the ordered set of indexes read from x during the RAM computation $\text{T}^{[x]}(y)$. Then, for every $k' \geq k$, for every memory mapping $\text{map} = (i'_1, \dots, i'_{k'}) \subseteq [n]$, for every read-only RAM accessible input $x' = (x'_1, \dots, x'_{k'})$ such that*

- ***map** is ordered, i.e., $\forall j \in [k' - 1]$ then $i'_j < i'_{j+1}$,*
- *$\forall i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ then $i_j \in \text{map}$,*
- *$\forall i'_j \in \text{map}$, if $i'_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ then $x'_j = x_{i'_j}$,*

we have $\mathbb{P}[\text{T}^{[x]}(y) = \text{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)] = 1$.

Invalid mapping: *For every read-only RAM accessible input $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and for every arbitrary binary input $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$, let $\mathcal{I}_{x,y} = \{i_1, \dots, i_k\}$ be the ordered set of indexes read from x during the RAM computation T . Then, for every memory mapping $\text{map} = (i'_1, \dots, i'_{k'}) \subseteq [n]$, for every read-only RAM accessible input $x' = (x'_1, \dots, x'_{k'})$ such that*

- ***map** is ordered, i.e., $\forall j \in [k' - 1]$ then $i'_j < i'_{j+1}$,*
- *$\exists i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ such that $i_j \notin \text{map}$,*
- *$\forall i'_j \in \text{map}$ then $x'_j = x_{i'_j}$,*

we have $\mathbb{P}[\text{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y) = \perp] = 1$.

Intuitively, *perfect correctness* says that $\text{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)$ performs the same computation as $\text{T}^{[x]}(y)$ when **map** provides the correct mapping between x' and x for all the indexes $\mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ read by $\text{T}^{[x]}(y)$. (Observe that **Definition 12** allows x' and **map** to additionally include blocks and indexes not read by $\text{T}^{[x]}$. Still, this does not affect the computation of $\text{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)$).

On the other hand, *invalid mapping* says that $\text{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)$ outputs $\perp$ when **map** does not contain an index $i_j \notin \text{map}$ which, instead, is read by $\text{T}^{[x]}(y)$. Looking ahead, this property is fundamental to prove security of our verifiable data structure for univariate polynomial evaluation (**Section 5**).

The following theorem states (whose proof appears in **Appendix A.3**) that any deterministic RAM algorithm has its localized deterministic RAM algorithm. Moreover, the theorem also explicates the running time of the localized RAM algorithm in terms of the running time of the original one.

Theorem 3. *If there exists a deterministic RAM algorithm T , then there exists a deterministic RAM algorithm Local.T which is the localized version of T (**Definition 12**). In addition, for every read-only RAM accessible input x , arbitrary binary input y , read-only RAM accessible input x' ,*

²⁰This is essentially identical to how virtual memories work in practice.

and read-only RAM accessible memory mapping map , the running time of $\text{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)$ is at most $t \cdot \log(|\text{map}|)$ where t is the running time of $\text{T}^{[x]}(y)$. The running times of both T and Local.T are measured in the RAM model of computation.

For the sake of clarity, in the remaining sections we drop the oracle notation $[x]$ used to denote a RAM accessible input. Thus, we will write $\text{Local.T}(y, x)$ (instead of $\text{Local.T}^{[x]}(y)$) when it is clear that x is the RAM accessible input.

5 Verifiable DS for Univariate Polynomial Evaluation

We extend the notion of DS for univariate polynomial evaluation (introduced in [Section 3.4](#)) by making it verifiable, i.e., making it possible to check that $y = f(x)$. Intuitively, the syntax of verifiable DS (VDS, in short) for univariate polynomial evaluation is analogous to that of (non-verifiable) DS except that the evaluation algorithm produces a proof π that can later be verified by the corresponding verification algorithm Verify . To make the verification process work, a VDS also has some public parameters pp (taken as input by all algorithms) and a digest h that is a succinct representative value of the data structure D .

Formally, a VDS for evaluation of univariate polynomials is composed of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

Setup(1^λ): On input the security parameter 1^λ , the randomized setup algorithm outputs the public parameters pp .

GenData(pp, f, p): On input the public parameters pp , a univariate polynomial $f(X) = \sum_{i=0}^d a_i \cdot X^i \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ (of degree $d \in \mathbb{N}$) and a prime $p \in \mathbb{N}$, the deterministic data structure generation algorithm outputs a data structure D , a digest h (of the data structure D), and auxiliary information aux (required to compute proofs of correctness).

Eval($\text{pp}, x, \text{D}, \text{aux}$): On input the public parameters pp , a point $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, a data structure D , and auxiliary information aux , the deterministic evaluation algorithm outputs $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and a proof π .

Verify($\text{pp}, \text{h}, x, y, \pi$): On input the public parameters pp , a digest h , a point $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, a value $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and a proof π , the deterministic verification algorithm outputs a decision bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

We assume that p is a prime (thus, $\mathbb{Z}_p$ is a field of prime order) for simplicity, since our PoRep will leverage such fields.

A VDS must satisfy the standard notions of correctness and completeness. The former says that VDS allows one to correctly compute $y = f(x)$, whereas the latter says that honestly generated proofs always verify. Differently from non-verifiable DS, a VDS additionally needs to satisfy soundness in order to be considered secure. At a high level, it is infeasible for a malicious evaluator to produce a proof π that verifies with respect to an incorrect output $y \neq f(x)$.

Definition 13 (Perfect correctness of VDS). *A VDS $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{GenData}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ for evaluation of univariate polynomials is perfectly correct if $\forall \lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $\forall$ prime $p \in \mathbb{N}$, $\forall f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$, $\forall x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, the following probability holds:*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ (y, \pi) = \text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x, \text{D}, \text{aux}) \\ (y, \pi) = \text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x, \text{D}, \text{aux}) \end{array} \right] = 1$$

Definition 14 (Perfect completeness of VDS). A VDS $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{GenData}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ for evaluation of univariate polynomials is perfectly complete if $\forall \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \forall \text{ prime } p \in \mathbb{N}, \forall f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X], \forall x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, the following probability holds:

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{Verify}(\text{pp}, h, x, y, \pi) = 1 : \begin{array}{l} (D, h, \text{aux}) = \text{GenData}(\text{pp}, f, p) \\ (y, \pi) = \text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x, D, \text{aux}) \end{array} \end{array} \right] = 1$$

Definition 15 (Soundness of VDS). A VDS $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{GenData}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ for evaluation of univariate polynomials is (ϵ) -sound if for every valid PPT adversary A , the following probability holds:

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{Verify}(\text{pp}, h, x, y, \pi) = 1 \wedge y \neq f(x) : \begin{array}{l} (x, y, \pi, f, p) \leftarrow A(1^\lambda, \text{pp}) \\ (D, h, \text{aux}) = \text{GenData}(\text{pp}, f, p) \end{array} \end{array} \right] \leq \epsilon.$$

An adversary A is called valid if $p \in \mathbb{N}$ is a prime and $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$.²¹

Observe that the above definition is fully adaptive even if A does not take as input the tuple (D, h, aux) . This is because GenData is deterministic.

Lastly, we extend the notion of efficiency with (γ) -expansion of DS (see Definition 7) to the setting of VDS. The only difference is that (i) we consider a doubly-efficient VDS where both evaluation and verification run in time poly-logarithmic in the degree d of the polynomial, and (ii) the expansion is defined as $\gamma = \frac{|D| + |\text{aux}|}{|f(X)|}$, i.e., we consider as expansion any information (that depends on $f(X)$) required for evaluation which is capable of computing $y = f(x)$ and its corresponding proof π (observe that the computation of π requires knowledge of aux).²² We do not include the public parameters pp in the expansion factor since they only depend on the security parameter.

Definition 16 (Double-efficiency with (γ) -expansion of VDS). A VDS $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{GenData}, \text{Eval}, \text{Verify})$ for evaluation of univariate polynomials is doubly-efficient with (γ) -expansion if the following conditions hold:

(γ) -expansion: The size of (D, aux) (output by $\text{GenData}(\text{pp}, f, p)$) is bounded by $|f(X)| \cdot \gamma = (d+1) \log(p) \cdot \gamma$ where d is the degree of $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ and $\log(p)$ is the size of a coefficient $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ of $f(X)$. The expansion parameter γ may depend on the security parameter λ , the degree d of $f(X)$, and bit length $\log(p)$ of p .

Efficient evaluation and verification: Both Eval and Verify have (worst-case) running time $\text{poly}(\lambda, \log(d), \log(p))$ where d is the degree of $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ and $\log(p)$ is the size of a coefficient $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ of $f(X)$ (recall that $f(X)$ and p are given in input to GenData). The running time of both Eval and Verify is measured in the RAM model of computation.

5.1 (Doubly-efficient) VDS from DS and VC

We build a doubly-efficient VDS (Section 5 and Definition 16) from any efficient DS for evaluation of univariate polynomials (Section 3.4 and Definition 7) and efficient VC schemes (Section 3.3 and Definition 3). At a high level, the construction leverages the fact that a verifier

²¹We assume that p (output by A) is a prime only because we will leverage fields of prime order when building our PoRep scheme. Hence, this definition can be extended to any field (e.g., composite p).

²²Recall that in DS the only additional information was the expansion of D introduced to handle fast evaluation. See Definition 16.

can check $y \stackrel{?}{=} f(x)$ by using $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}$ which is the (deterministic) localized RAM version of the (deterministic) RAM evaluation algorithm of DS (see [Definition 12](#)) as described in the technical overview ([Section 1.2](#)). The formal construction follows.

Construction 1. Consider the following ingredients:

1. A DS scheme $\Pi_{\text{DS}} = (\text{GenData}_{\text{DS}}, \text{Eval}_{\text{DS}})$ for evaluation of univariate polynomials. Without loss of generality, we assume that the output space of $\text{GenData}_{\text{DS}}$ is $\{0, 1\}^{\ell \cdot z}$, i.e., the (read-only RAM accessible) data structure $\mathbf{D} = (D_1, \dots, D_\ell)$ is composed of $\ell = \ell(d)$ blocks each of size z (for some arbitrary $z \in \mathbb{N}$).²³ Observe that the degree d of $f(X)$ (the polynomial given in input to $\text{GenData}_{\text{DS}}$) affects the length of the data structure $\mathbf{D}$ (see [Corollary 3](#)) and, for this reason, $\ell = \ell(d)$ is a function of d .
2. A deterministic RAM algorithm $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}$ that is the localized version of the deterministic RAM algorithm Eval_{DS} of Π_{DS} ([Definition 12](#)).
3. A VC scheme $\Pi_{\text{VC}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{VC}}, \text{Commit}_{\text{VC}}, \text{Open}_{\text{VC}}, \text{Verify}_{\text{VC}})$ with message space $\{0, 1\}^z$ where z is the block size of the output space of $\text{GenData}_{\text{DS}}$ (as defined in [Item 1](#)).

We build a VDS scheme Π for evaluation of univariate polynomials as follows:

Setup(1^λ): On input the security parameter 1^λ , the randomized setup algorithm outputs $\text{pp} = \text{pp}_{\text{VC}} \leftarrow^{\$} \text{Setup}_{\text{VC}}(1^\lambda)$.

GenData(pp, f, p): On input the public parameters $\text{pp} = \text{pp}_{\text{VC}}$, a univariate polynomial $f(X) = \sum_{i=0}^d a_i \cdot X^i \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ of degree d , and a prime $p \in \mathbb{N}$, the deterministic data structure generation algorithm computes $\mathbf{D} = (D_1, \dots, D_\ell) = \text{GenData}_{\text{DS}}(f, p)$ and $(\mathbf{c}, \text{aux}) = \text{Commit}_{\text{VC}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VC}}, (D_1, \dots, D_\ell))$ (recall that $\ell = \ell(d)$). Finally, it outputs the data structure $\mathbf{D}$, the digest $\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{c}$, and the auxiliary information aux .

Eval($\text{pp}, x, \mathbf{D}, \text{aux}$): On input the public parameters $\text{pp} = \text{pp}_{\text{VC}}$, a point $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, a data structure $\mathbf{D}$, and auxiliary information aux , the deterministic evaluation algorithm proceeds as follows:

1. Execute $\text{Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, \mathbf{D}) = y$ and let $\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}} = \{i_1, \dots, i_k\}$ be the ordered set of indexes read from $\mathbf{D}$ during the computation $\text{Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, \mathbf{D})$ (recall that Eval_{DS} is a RAM algorithm. See [Definitions 10 and 11](#)).
2. For $j \in \mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}$, compute $\pi_j = \text{Open}_{\text{VC}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VC}}, D_j, j, \text{aux})$.

Finally, it outputs $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and $\pi = (\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}, \{D_j\}_{j \in \mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}}, \{\pi_j\}_{j \in \mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}})$.

Verify($\text{pp}, \mathbf{h}, x, y, \pi$): On input the public parameters $\text{pp} = \text{pp}_{\text{VC}}$, a digest $\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{c}$, a point $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, a value $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and a proof $\pi = (\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}, \{D_j\}_{j \in \mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}}, \{\pi_j\}_{j \in \mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}})$, the deterministic verification algorithm proceeds as follows:

1. Check that $|\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}| \leq \ell$ and $\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}} = \{i_1, \dots, i_k\}$ is ordered. If not, return 0.
2. For $j \in \mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}$, compute $\text{Verify}_{\text{VC}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VC}}, \mathbf{c}, D_j, j, \pi_j) = b_j$.
3. Execute the localized algorithm $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, (D_{i_1}, \dots, D_{i_k}), \text{map}) = y'$ where $\text{map} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$.²⁴

²³This means that a z -bit size block of $\mathbf{D}$ can be read in constant time in the RAM model of computation.

²⁴Recall that $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, (D_{i_1}, \dots, D_{i_k}), \text{map})$ corresponds to $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}^{[D_{i_1}, \dots, D_{i_k}], [\text{map}]}(x)$ using the oracle abstraction introduced in [Section 4](#).

Finally, the verification algorithm outputs 1 if $y = y'$ and $b_j = 1$ for every $j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,D}$. Otherwise, it outputs 0.

Below, we report the results regarding correctness, completeness, and soundness of [Construction 1](#). The formal proofs appear in [Appendices A.4](#) and [A.5](#).

Theorem 4. *Let Π_{DS} , Local.Eval_{DS} , and Π_{VC} be as defined in [Construction 1](#). If Π_{DS} is perfectly correct ([Definition 6](#)) then Π of [Construction 1](#) is perfectly correct ([Definition 13](#)). If Π_{VC} is perfectly correct ([Definition 4](#)) and Local.Eval_{DS} is perfectly correct ([Definition 12](#)) then Π of [Construction 1](#) is perfectly complete ([Definition 14](#)).*

Theorem 5. *Let Π_{DS} , Local.Eval_{DS} , and Π_{VC} as defined in [Construction 1](#). If Π_{DS} is perfectly correct ([Definition 6](#)), Local.Eval_{DS} satisfies the invalid mapping property ([Definition 12](#)), Π_{VC} is perfectly correct ([Definition 4](#)) and (ϵ_{VC}) -position binding ([Definition 5](#)), then Π from [Construction 1](#) is $(\ell \cdot \epsilon_{VC})$ -sound.*

[Construction 1](#) is doubly-efficient if both the underlying DS and VC scheme are efficient. Moreover, the expansion factor of [Construction 1](#) depends on the expansion factor of DS and the size of aux generated by the VC scheme (observe that aux is needed to correctly compute a proof π). Below, we state the formal result whose proof is deferred to [Appendix A.7](#).

Theorem 6. *If Π_{DS} is efficient with (γ_{DS}) -expansion ([Definition 7](#)) and Π_{VC} is efficient ([Definition 3](#)) then Π of [Construction 1](#) is doubly-efficient with (γ) -expansion for $\gamma = \gamma_{DS} + \frac{|\text{aux}|}{|f(X)|}$, where $f(X)$ is the univariate polynomial taken into account and aux is the auxiliary information generated by Π_{VC} .*

The following corollary is obtained by combining [Theorem 6](#) and [Corollaries 2](#) and [3](#) (see [Appendix A.6](#) for the formal proof).

Corollary 5. *Under the collision-resistant hash function assumption, for every positive constant $\delta > 0$, there exists a VDS for evaluation of univariate polynomials that is $(\text{negl}(\lambda))$ -sound and doubly-efficient with (γ) -expansion for $\gamma = 2(d+1)^\delta \log^{o(1)}(p)$ where $\log(p)$ and d are the size of the prime p and the degree of $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ (given in input to `GenData`), respectively. Moreover, we have that $|\mathbf{h}| = \lambda$, i.e., digests are succinct.*

6 Proof-of-Replication

A proof-of-replication (PoRep) scheme allows a verifier to efficiently check that a prover is using a significant amount of space to store an arbitrary message $m \in \mathcal{M}$.²⁵ The space required to store m must be sufficiently large even if m is highly compressible. Moreover, PoRep guarantees that m can be retrieved if the prover passes the verification process. PoRep was previously proposed in [\[31\]](#). Our syntax and security definitions below generally capture the same properties, but they are tailored to reflect the objectives and contributions of this work.

Formally, we define a PoRep scheme with message space $\mathcal{M}$, identifier space $\mathcal{I}$, and challenge space $\mathcal{C}$ to consist of the following polynomial-time algorithms:²⁶

Setup($1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n$): On input the security, time, and memory parameters $(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n)$, the randomized setup algorithm outputs a public encoding key ek , a public proving key pk , and a public verification key vk .

²⁵We use the term “message” to refer to a file that needs to be stored.

²⁶Following [\[31\]](#), if needed, one can consider PoRep scheme with an additional message preprocessing algorithm (e.g., encryption of the message) executed by the data owner, or a polling algorithm when challenges are structured.

Encode(ek, m , id): On input the public encoding key ek, a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and an identifier id $\in \mathcal{I}$ (for the message m), the deterministic encoding algorithm outputs an encoding c (of the message m with associated identifier id) and a digest h (of the encoding c).

Prove(pk, chall, c): On input the public proving key pk, a challenge chall $\in \mathcal{C}$, and an encoding c , the deterministic proving algorithm outputs a proof π .

Verify(vk, h , chall, π): On input the public verification key vk, a digest h , a challenge chall, and a proof π , the deterministic algorithm outputs $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Decode(ek, c , id): On input the public encoding key ek, an encoding c , and an identifier id $\in \mathcal{I}$, the deterministic decoding algorithm outputs $m \in \mathcal{M}$.²⁷

We require a PoRep scheme to satisfy the standard notions of correctness and completeness. The former says that an honest execution (of PoRep's algorithms) allows for the correct decoding of the message, whereas the latter says that honest proofs always verify.

Definition 17 (Perfect correctness of PoRep). *A PoRep $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Encode}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}, \text{Decode})$ with message space $\mathcal{M}$, identifier space $\mathcal{I}$, and challenge space $\mathcal{C}$ is perfectly correct if $\forall \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \forall t \in \mathbb{N}, \forall n \in \mathbb{N} \forall m \in \mathcal{M}, \forall \text{id} \in \mathcal{I}$, the following probability holds:*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\text{Decode}(\text{ek}, c, \text{id}) = m : \begin{array}{l} (\text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n) \\ (c, h) = \text{Encode}(\text{ek}, m, \text{id}) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

Definition 18 (Perfect completeness of PoRep). *A PoRep $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Encode}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}, \text{Decode})$ with message space $\mathcal{M}$, identifier space $\mathcal{I}$, and challenge space $\mathcal{C}$ is perfectly complete if $\forall \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \forall t \in \mathbb{N}, \forall n \in \mathbb{N}, \forall m \in \mathcal{M}, \forall \text{id} \in \mathcal{I}, \forall \text{chall} \in \mathcal{C}$, the following probability holds:*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\text{Verify}(\text{vk}, h, \text{chall}, \pi) = 1 : \begin{array}{l} (\text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n) \\ (c, h) = \text{Encode}(\text{ek}, m, \text{id}) \\ \pi = \text{Prove}(\text{pk}, \text{chall}, c) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

In addition, we are interested in PoRep protocols that are doubly-efficient, i.e., the running times of both **Prove** and **Verify** are poly-logarithmic in the size $|m|$ of m in the RAM model of computation. This is fundamental to having a fast auditing phase (the main objective of this work). Analogous to VDS, the encoding c may be larger than m to achieve the above double-efficiency property. Thus, we extend the notion of (γ) -expansion to PoRep except that γ is defined with respect to $|m|$, i.e., $\gamma = \frac{|c|}{|m|}$ (this means that $|c| = |m| \cdot \gamma$).

Definition 19 (Double-efficiency with (γ) -expansion of PoRep). *A PoRep $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Encode}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}, \text{Decode})$ with message space $\mathcal{M}$, identifier space $\mathcal{I}$, and challenge space $\mathcal{C}$ is doubly-efficient with (γ) -expansion if the following conditions hold:*

(γ) -expansion: *The size of c (output by **Encode**(ek, m , id)) is bounded by $|m| \cdot \gamma$ where m is the encoded message. The expansion parameter γ may depend on the security parameter λ and the size $|m|$ of m .*

Efficient proving and verification: *Both **Prove** and **Verify** have (worst-case) running time $\text{poly}(\lambda, \log(|m|))$ where $|m|$ is the size of the encoded message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ (recall that m is given as input to **Encode**). The running times of both **Prove** and **Verify** are measured in the RAM model of computation.*

We now turn to security. A PoRep must satisfy two notions, named *replication* and *extraction*, which we formally define in the remainder of this section.

²⁷Note that **Decode** takes as input the encoding c . This implies that **Decode** is executed by the prover (i.e., the encoding holder) when asked to return the encoded message m .




Figure 1: Experiment $\mathbf{G}_{\mathbf{A}, \Pi}^{\text{replicate}}(\lambda, t, n, u)$ defining (ϵ, σ, n, u) -replication of PoRep (Definition 20). The experiment is parametrized by the security parameter λ , the time parameter t (defining the parallel running time of `Encode`), the memory parameter n (defining the minimum memory usage, i.e., $|\alpha| \leq n$), and the number of messages u of the experiment. In addition, ϵ and $\sigma = \sigma(t)$ of (ϵ, σ, n, u) -replication are the maximum advantage of the adversary $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2, \mathbf{A}_3)$ and the maximum parallel running time of $\mathbf{A}_3$, respectively.

Replication of PoRep. In a nutshell, a PoRep must force a prover to use memory of size n (to store $m \in \mathcal{M}$) in order to produce a proof that verifies. For any adversarially chosen message m , an adversary cannot compress an honestly computed encoding c (output by `Encode`(ek, m, id)) into a string α (i.e., the memory) of size n while passing the verification process. The same guarantee must hold even if the adversary is required to store $u > 1$ (possibly identical) messages $(m_1, \dots, m_u)$ and pass the verification for each of those messages. In this case, the memory bound $n = n(u)$ is a function of the number of messages u (optimally we would like n to scale linearly in u).

As discussed in the technical overview, we consider trapdoorless PoRep. Thus, the above notion cannot be achieved without restricting the behavior of the adversary (see the PRF-based attack described in Section 1.2).

For this reason, we consider PoRep with a “slow” encoding algorithm `Encode` (the slowness of `Encode` can be tuned by setting the time parameter t chosen during `Setup`), and we restrict the adversary to produce a valid proof in less time than required to execute `Encode`. In the trapdoorless setting, several works [30, 29, 11, 50, 6, 48, 31] have considered adversaries with restricted running time. The formal definition follows.

Definition 20 (Replication of PoRep). *Let $\sigma(\lambda, t, n) = \sigma$ be a polynomial function of the security parameter λ , the time parameter t , and the memory bound n , and let $n(\lambda, u) = n$ be a function that depends on the security parameter λ and the number of messages $u \in \mathbb{N}$. A PoRep $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Encode}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}, \text{Decode})$ with message space $\mathcal{M}$, identifier space $\mathcal{I}$, and challenge space $\mathcal{C}$ satisfies (ϵ, σ, n, u) -replication if for every valid PPT adversary $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2, \mathbf{A}_3)$, we have $\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{G}_{\mathbf{A}, \Pi}^{\text{replicate}}(\lambda, t, n, u) = 1] \leq \epsilon$ where $\mathbf{G}_{\mathbf{A}, \Pi}^{\text{replicate}}$ is depicted in Figure 1.*

An adversary $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2, \mathbf{A}_3)$ is called valid if $\mathbf{A}_3$ runs in parallel time σ with $\text{poly}(t)$ processors.²⁸

Observe that both $\mathbf{A}_1$ and $\mathbf{A}_2$ are unrestricted; thus, they can perform any polynomial-time computation (even running `Encode` over multiple adversarially chosen messages and identifiers). Also, in addition to α , $\mathbf{A}_3$ takes as input anything that is not produced by `Encode`. This

²⁸Notice that a winning adversary for Definition 20 must output α such that $|\alpha| \leq n$, i.e., it tries to produce valid proofs while saving memory.

means that A_2 only needs to encode in α (in a compressed fashion) **Encode**'s output. Finally, we associate a random but public identifier id only after A_1 has committed to the challenge message m (note that both A_2 and A_3 take id as input). This allows **Encode** to have some randomness (i.e., the identifier) which is not correlated to the chosen message m , allowing it to produce an incompressible encoding c which is fundamental in order to achieve [Definition 20](#).²⁹ Practical implementations of random identifiers in decentralized systems (such as blockchain systems) are random beacons, hashing the last blocks of a blockchain, or hashing the message m_i together with its index i , i.e., $\text{id}_i = H(m_i, i)$.

Remark 2 (On the honest execution of **Encode**). *In [Definition 20](#), we assume that **Encode** is honestly executed. This is because the digest h is fundamental in order to have a sound verification process (as h provides a binding guarantee on the original m). However, this setting is not compatible with decentralized scenarios (e.g., blockchain systems) in which the prover (which can be malicious) is entitled to run **Encode**. Still, we highlight that standard techniques for verifying computations (such as SNARKs) can be used to efficiently verify that h has been honestly computed (note that h 's computation does not require any secret, making verification easier).³⁰ In other words, **Encode** will output a SNARK proof π to demonstrate that the encoding has been honestly executed (note that this does not affect the doubly-efficient property of PoRep ([Definition 19](#)) since the latter bounds the proof generation and verification of the auditing phase which is executed only after the verification of the encoding phase). For the sake of exposition, we choose not to deal with malicious executions of **Encode** since the main objective of this paper is to propose a novel approach for the PoRep verification phase. For completeness, we stress that Fisch's work [\[31\]](#) does not assume a trusted encoding since it proposes a probabilistic verification for checking the encoding correctness.*

Memory gap of PoRep. The memory gap of PoRep is defined as the distance between the sizes $|m_1| + \dots + |m_u|$ of the u messages to be stored and the maximum parameter n for which the PoRep satisfies replication (with respect to u messages) with negligible adversarial advantage (formally, $(\text{negl}(\lambda), \sigma, n, u)$ -replication for some σ). The notion of gap is useful for comparison between different PoRep schemes.

Definition 21 ((η) -gap of PoRep). *A PoRep $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Encode}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}, \text{Decode})$ with message space $\mathcal{M}$, identifier space $\mathcal{I}$, and challenge space $\mathcal{C}$ has (η) -gap if Π satisfies $(\text{negl}(\lambda), n, \sigma, u)$ -replication and $n = (1 - \eta)(u \cdot \log(|\mathcal{M}|))$ where $\log(|\mathcal{M}|)$ is the length of the messages supported by Π . The gap parameter $\eta = \eta(\lambda, u, \log(|\mathcal{M}|))$ can depend on the security parameter λ , the number of encoded messages u , and the length of the supported messages $\log(|\mathcal{M}|)$.*

Intuitively, the smaller the gap, the better the robustness of the PoRep scheme. This is because an adversary, to pass the verification with non-negligible probability, is forced to use memory that is close to the sizes of the u messages which it is entitled to store (where closeness is defined by the gap parameter η).

Remark 3 (On our space gap notion). *We consider a scenario wherein security is maintained against adversaries who store a fraction of the file considered insufficiently small. Our definition intuitively encapsulates this setting. It is noteworthy that our concept of a space gap diverges from that presented in [\[31\]](#), where the gap quantifies the storage discrepancy between*

²⁹If m is correlated to id , then c has no chance to be incompressible, as **Encode** is deterministic.

³⁰We mention that a straightforward application of a SNARK to prove that **Encode** was executed correctly would require the heuristic instantiation of an RO through the circuit of a concrete hash function. (This is a non-standard but common technique; see [\[53\]](#).) This is because the RO is used both in our modular constructions (explicitly) and in the MHF (implicitly, for common instantiations).

honest and dishonest providers. Moreover, the (η) -gap for our framework, as per Fisch's conceptualization [31], can be determined by the divergence (as specified in Definition 21) between n (from $(\text{negl}(\lambda), n, \sigma, u)$ -replication) and $u \cdot |m| \cdot \gamma$, where γ signifies the expansion coefficient (Definition 19) inherent to our schemes (explicitly, η is such that $n = (1 - \eta)u \cdot |m| \cdot \gamma$). Refer to Table 1 for more details.

Extractability of PoRep. We now turn to extraction. PoRep is extractable if there is a universal extractor Ext that, given $(\text{ek}, \text{vk}, \text{h}, \text{id})$ and oracle access to the adversary, is able to extract the encoded message m . Naturally, this must hold only when the adversary is able to produce verifying proofs with respect to h , i.e., the digest of the encoding of m . We use a standard definition of extraction, considering (i) universal PPT extractors, and (ii) adversaries with noticeable (i.e., non-negligible) probability in producing verifying proofs.³¹




Figure 2: Experiment defining extractability of PoRep. The extractor Ext of $\mathbf{G}_{\text{A}, \text{Ext}, \Pi}^{\text{extract}}(\lambda, t, n, u)$ has oracle access to $\text{A}_3(\cdot)$ which is defined as $\text{A}_3(\cdot) = \text{A}_3(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk}, (\text{id}_i)_{i \in [u]}, \cdot, \alpha)$, i.e., Ext can only submit challenges $\text{chall} \in \mathcal{C}$ to $\text{A}_3(\cdot)$.

Below, we report the formal definition of extraction of PoRep. For the sake of clarity, we directly define extraction in the asymptotic setting since the definition only depends on λ (i.e., we do not put any time and memory restriction on the adversary except from being polynomial in λ).

Definition 22 (Extractability of PoRep). *A PoRep $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Encode}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}, \text{Decode})$ with message space $\mathcal{M}$, identifier space $\mathcal{I}$, and challenge space $\mathcal{C}$ is extractable if there exists an universal PPT extractor Ext such that $\forall \lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $\forall t \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $\forall n \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $\forall u \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $\forall n \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$, and for every PPT adversary $\text{A} = (\text{A}_1, \text{A}_2, \text{A}_3)$, the following condition holds:*

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbf{G}_{\text{A}, \Pi}^{\text{replicate}}(\lambda, t, n, u) = 1\right] \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\lambda)} \implies \mathbb{P}\left[\mathbf{G}_{\text{A}, \text{Ext}, \Pi}^{\text{extract}}(\lambda, t, n, u) = 1\right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda), \quad (1)$$

where the experiments $\mathbf{G}_{\text{A}, \Pi}^{\text{replicate}}(\lambda, t, n, u)$ and $\mathbf{G}_{\text{A}, \text{Ext}, \Pi}^{\text{extract}}(\lambda, t, n, u)$ are depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively. We stress that A does not need to be valid with respect to experiment $\mathbf{G}_{\text{A}, \Pi}^{\text{replicate}}(\lambda, t, n, u)$ as defined in Definition 20 (i.e., Ext is able to extract independently from the running time and the memory used by the adversary).

We highlight that the head of the implication (Equation (1)) implies that the adversary passes the verification with non-negligible probability (see experiment $\mathbf{G}_{\text{A}, \Pi}^{\text{replicate}}(\lambda, t, n, u)$ in Figure 2). Moreover, Ext of $\mathbf{G}_{\text{A}, \text{Ext}, \Pi}^{\text{extract}}(\lambda, t, n, u)$ (Figure 2) has only oracle access to A_3 and no a-priori knowledge about $(m_1, \dots, m_u)$ (the messages that Ext needs to extract).

³¹If the adversary passes the verification with negligible probability then extraction cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, any adversary (even one that does not know m) can pass the verification with negligible probability by simply guessing the verifying proof π .

Remark 4 (Alternative Syntax of PoRep). We explore an alternative version of PoRep capable of encoding multiple (u) messages concurrently. In this variant, the encoding of each message, denoted as c_i , may rely on the identifiers of other messages. Formally, given an encoding key ek , u identifiers $(id_1, \dots, id_u)$, and u messages $(m_1, \dots, m_u)$, the encoding function $\text{Encode}(ek, (id_i)_{i \in [u]}, (m_i)_{i \in [u]})$ produces u encodings $(c_i)_{i \in [u]}$ and u digests $(h_i)_{i \in [u]}$. Proof generation and verification processes remain individualized for each encoding, i.e., $\text{Prove}(pk, \text{chall}, c_i) = \pi$ and $\text{Verify}(vk, h_i, \text{chall}, \pi) = b$. Decoding any single encoding c_i necessitates all u identifiers used in the encoding phase, i.e., $\text{Decode}(ek, c_k, (id_i)_{i \in [u]}) = m_k$. This PoRep variant's security definitions, as introduced earlier, are appropriately extended. In [Section 6.1](#), we present a PoRep construction based on this syntax, achieving an improved memory bound n for (ϵ, σ, n, u) -replication.

6.1 Constructions

Next, we present two PoRep constructions. At a high level, our first construction compels a prover to utilize memory $n \approx \min\{n_{\text{MHF}}, u \cdot |m|\}$, where n_{MHF} is the memory bound imposed by the MHF, and u is the number of messages stored. To enforce the optimal memory bound of $\approx u \cdot |m|$, this framework mandates setting $n_{\text{MHF}} \geq u \cdot |m|$, achievable with an established a-priori maximum for the message count u_{max} (this approach is denoted as the bounded PoRep).

Subsequently, we outline an unbounded PoRep that attains $n \approx \min\{u \cdot n_{\text{MHF}}, u \cdot |m|\}$. Therefore, it can ensure the optimal memory usage of $\approx u \cdot |m|$ regardless of the bounds on u , by simply adjusting $n_{\text{MHF}} \geq |m|$. This latter construction adheres to the alternative syntax highlighted in [Remark 4](#).

First Construction: Bounded Number of Messages We devise a bounded PoRep scheme leveraging a single-instance MHF with input-dependent preprocessing, VDS, and a hash function H , modeled as a RO.

Construction 2 (Bounded PoRep). Consider the following ingredients:

1. A prime p of $(s_p + 1)$ -bits and a prime q of (s_q) -bits where $q \leq p$ (by definition $\mathbb{Z}_q \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_p$ when $q \leq p$), $s_p(\lambda) = s_p$ and $s_q(\lambda) = s_q$ are two polynomials in the security parameter. We assume that s_q is at least $\omega(\log(\lambda))$ w.l.o.g.
2. An MHF scheme $\Pi_{\text{MHF}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}})$ with input space $\mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ and output space $\mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}}$, and a VDS $\Pi_{\text{VDS}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{VDS}}, \text{GenData}_{\text{VDS}}, \text{Eval}_{\text{VDS}}, \text{Verify}_{\text{VDS}})$ for evaluation of univariate polynomials.
3. A hash function $H : \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{d \cdot s_p}$ modeled as a RO.

We build a PoRep scheme Π with message space $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^{d \cdot s_p}$ (for any $d < q$), identifier space $\mathcal{I} = \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$, and challenge space $\mathcal{C} = \mathbb{Z}_q$, as follows:

Setup $(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n)$: On input the security, time, and memory parameters $(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n)$, the randomized setup algorithm outputs a public encoding key $ek = (\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}})$, a public proving key $pk = \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}$, and a public verification key $vk = \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}$ where $\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}} \leftarrow^s \text{Setup}_{\text{MHF}}(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n)$ and $\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}} \leftarrow^s \text{Setup}_{\text{VDS}}(1^\lambda)$.

Encode (ek, m, id) : On input the public encoding key $ek = (\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}})$, a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^{d \cdot s_p}$, and an identifier $id \in \mathcal{I}$ (for the message m), the deterministic encoding algorithm computes $v = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, id)$ and $r = H(v, id)$. In addition, it computes

$r \oplus m = f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ (i.e., $r \oplus m$ is interpreted as a random polynomial $f(X)$ of degree $d - 1$ from $\mathbb{Z}_p[X]$) and $(h, D, \text{aux}) = \text{GenData}_{\text{VDS}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, f, p)$. Finally, it returns $c = (D, \text{aux})$ and h .

Prove(pk, chall, c): On input the public proving key $\text{pk} = \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}$, a challenge $\text{chall} = x \in \mathcal{C}$, and the encoding $c = (D, \text{aux})$, the deterministic proving algorithm outputs a proof $\pi = (y, \pi') = \text{Eval}_{\text{VDS}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, x, D, \text{aux})$.

Verify(vk, h, chall, π): On input the public verification key $\text{vk} = \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}$, a digest h , a challenge $\text{chall} = x \in \mathcal{C}$, and a proof $\pi = (y, \pi')$, the deterministic verification algorithm outputs $b = \text{Verify}_{\text{VDS}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, h, x, y, \pi')$.

Decode(ek, c, id): On input the public encoding key $\text{ek} = (\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}})$, an encoding $c = (D, \text{aux})$, and an identifier $\text{id} \in \mathcal{I}$, the deterministic decoding algorithm proceeds as follows:

- For every $i \in [d]$, compute $(y_i, \pi_i) = \text{Eval}_{\text{VDS}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, i, D, \text{aux})$ (recall that $d < q$ thus $d \in \mathbb{Z}_q = \mathcal{C}$).³²
- Compute a polynomial $f'(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ of degree $d - 1$ by running Lagrange interpolation on the points $(1, \dots, d)$ and the evaluations $(y_1, \dots, y_d)$.

Finally, it outputs $m = H(\text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}), \text{id}) \oplus f'(X)$.

Correctness, completeness, and double-efficiency trivially follow from that of VDS, so we omit the proof.

Theorem 7. Let Π_{VDS} be as defined in [Construction 2](#). If Π_{VDS} is perfectly correct ([Definition 13](#)) and doubly-efficient with (γ) -expansion ([Definition 16](#)), then Π of [Construction 2](#) is perfectly correct, perfectly complete, and doubly-efficient with (γ) -expansion.

As for replication and extraction, we establish the following results ([Theorems 8 and 9](#)) whose proofs appear in [Appendices A.8 and A.9](#).

Theorem 8. Let Π_{VDS} be as defined in [Construction 2](#). If Π_{VDS} is $(\text{negl}(\lambda))$ -sound ([Definition 5](#)), then Π of [Construction 2](#) is extractable.

Theorem 9. Let $s_p(\lambda) = s_p$, $s_q(\lambda) = s_q$, p , q , Π_{MHF} , Π_{VDS} , and H be as defined in [Construction 2](#). For every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $d \in \mathbb{N}$, $u \in \mathbb{N}$, $c \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $c < d(u \cdot s_p - s_q)$, under

- the existence of an (ϵ_{PRF}) -secure $\Pi_{\text{PRF}} = (\text{KGen}_{\text{PRF}}, \text{F}_{\text{PRF}})$ scheme with input space $\mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ and output space $\{0, 1\}^{d \cdot s_p}$ ([Definition 9](#)),
- $(\epsilon_{\text{MHF}}, \sigma_{\text{MHF}}, n_{\text{MHF}})$ -security of Π_{MHF} ([Definition 1](#)),
- (ϵ_{VDS}) -soundness of Π_{VDS} ([Definition 15](#)),

then Π of [Construction 2](#) satisfies $(\epsilon, \sigma_{\text{MHF}}, n, u)$ -replication ([Definition 20](#)) in the ROM for $n = \min\{n_{\text{MHF}}, d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c\}$, and $\epsilon = \epsilon_{\text{PRF}} + u \cdot q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}} + \frac{u}{|\mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}|} + u \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VDS}} + \frac{d-1}{|\mathbb{Z}_q|} + \frac{1}{2^c}$ where q_H is the number of queries submitted to the RO H .

³²We set $d < q$ to guarantee that the challenge space $\mathcal{C}$ contains at least d challenges required for re-computing $f(X)$ using Lagrange interpolation.

Remark 5 (On the Need of Assuming PRFs in [Theorem 9](#)). Surprisingly, [Theorem 9](#) holds under the existence of a secure PRF even if [Construction 2](#) does not involve a PRF at all. The reason behind the need of a PRF is due to the combination of the ROM with experiments (defining the security of a primitive) in which a multi-stage adversary is restricted to sharing a state of bounded size. Examples of such experiments are [Definitions 1 and 20](#) and [Theorem 2](#) in which there is a first adversary that passes to a second adversary a pre-computed state α (i.e., the memory) which is bounded by some parameter $n \geq |\alpha|$. For the sake of concreteness, consider a multi-stage reduction $A' = (A'_1, A'_2)$ that wins against the MHF experiment of [Definition 1](#) by using (in a black-box fashion) a multi-stage algorithm $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ against the replication experiment of [Definition 20](#) (this is exactly [Lemma 11](#) of the proof of [Theorem 9](#)). In order to correctly simulate A 's view, A' must answer to all the RO queries consistently. To do so, A must share a state which contains the mapping between the inputs/outputs of the simulated RO. However, A'_1 and A'_2 can only share a state $|\alpha| \leq n$ whereas A may submit any a-priori unknown number of RO queries which may require more than n bits to be stored. This means that A'_2 (the one that receives $|\alpha|$ from A'_1) may fail in replying consistently to the RO queries if A submits a particular query twice (submit the same query to both A'_1 and A'_2). To overcome this problem, we use a PRF that allows A' to compress the inputs/outputs of the RO by sharing a short PRF key k between A'_1 and A'_2 . In this way, A'_1 and A'_2 can answer consistently by replying with $F(k, x)$ when they receive a RO query x . This is exactly why we need a PRF to prove [Theorem 9](#) (see [Lemma 11](#) of [Theorem 9](#) for more details about the proof).

The following corollary (see [Appendix A.10](#) for the formal proof) demonstrates that [Construction 2](#) enforces a memory usage of $n = d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c$ (the bound due to our polynomial evaluation technique) if there is an a-priori bound $u_{\max}$ on the number of messages u ((this allows setting $n_{\text{MHF}} \geq d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c$ in [Theorem 9](#)). The corollary also reports the (η) -gap of [Construction 2](#).

Corollary 6. Consider an a-priori known upper bound $u_{\max} \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$ on the number of messages and let $u \leq u_{\max}$ be the number of messages stored by a prover. Under the collision-resistant hash function assumption, for every positive constant $\delta_1, \delta_2 > 0$, and for every $d \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$, there exists a PoRep scheme with message space $\{0, 1\}^{d \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta_1}}$ (i.e., $|m| = d \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta_1}$), identifier space $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and challenge space $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$ that satisfies $(\text{negl}(\lambda), \sigma, n, u)$ -replication, extraction, and double-efficiency with (γ) -expansion in the parallel ROM, where $n = d \cdot u \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta_1} - (d+1) \cdot \lambda \approx u \cdot |m|$, $\gamma = 2 \cdot d^{\delta_2} \cdot \lambda^{o(1)(1+\delta_1)}$, and $\sigma = \Omega(\ell)$, where ℓ is the number of blocks of the last layer of the DRG of the underlying MHF scheme. The (η) -gap of the aforementioned PoRep scheme is defined as $\eta = O\left(\frac{1}{u \cdot \lambda^{\delta_1}}\right)$.

Second construction: unbounded number of messages. Next, we propose a construction that supports an unbounded number of messages u . This construction follows the syntax defined in [Remark 4](#) and requires a multi-instance MHF ([Definition 2](#)) and an RO H that supports inputs of arbitrary (polynomial) size.

Construction 3 (Unbounded PoRep). Consider the following ingredients:

1. Let $p, q, s_p, s_q, \Pi_{\text{MHF}}$, and Π_{VDS} be as defined in [Construction 2](#),
2. A hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{d \cdot s_p}$ supporting inputs of arbitrary (polynomial) size, modeled as a RO.³³

³³ A RO with input space $\{0, 1\}^n$ can be generically transformed into one supporting inputs of arbitrary (polynomial) length by using a Merkle tree hashing style.

We build a PoRep scheme Π with message space $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^{d \cdot s_p}$ (for any $d < q$), identifier space $\mathcal{I} = \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$, and challenge space $\mathcal{C} = \mathbb{Z}_q$, as follows:

Setup($1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n$), **Prove**(pk, chall, c), and **Verify**(vk, h, chall, π): As defined in [Construction 2](#).

Encode(ek, $(m_i)_{i \in [j]}$, $(\text{id}_i)_{i \in [j]}$): On input the public encoding key $\text{ek} = (\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}})$, j messages $(m_i)_{i \in [j]} \in \{0, 1\}^{d \cdot s_p \cdot j}$ (for some arbitrary $j \in \mathbb{N}$), and j identifiers $(\text{id}_i)_{i \in [j]} \in \mathcal{I}^j$, the deterministic encoding algorithm computes $v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$ and $r_i = \text{H}_u(v_1, \dots, v_j, \text{id}_i)$ for $i \in [j]$. In addition, for $i \in [j]$, it computes $r_i \oplus m_i = f_i(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ and $(h_i, D_i, \text{aux}_i) = \text{GenData}_{\text{VDS}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, f_i, p)$. Finally, it outputs j encodings $(c_i)_{i \in [j]}$ (each encoding one of the j messages) and j digests $(h_i)_{i \in [j]}$ where $c_i = (D_i, \text{aux}_i)$.

Decode(ek, c_k , $(\text{id}_i)_{i \in [j]}$): On input the public encoding key $\text{ek} = (\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}})$, an encoding $c_k = (D_k, \text{aux}_k)$ (for $k \in [j]$), and j identifiers $(\text{id}_i)_{i \in [j]} \in \mathcal{I}^j$,³⁴ the deterministic decoding algorithm proceeds as follows:

- For every $i \in [d]$, compute $(y_i, \pi_i) = \text{Eval}_{\text{VDS}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, i, D_k, \text{aux}_k)$.
- Compute a polynomial $f'(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ of degree $d - 1$ by running Lagrange interpolation on the points $(1, \dots, d)$ and the evaluations $(y_1, \dots, y_d)$.
- For $i \in [j]$, compute $v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$.

Finally, it outputs $m_k = \text{H}(v_1, \dots, v_j, \text{id}_k) \oplus f'(X)$.

Below, we report the (ϵ, σ, n, u) -replication of [Construction 3](#) (proof appears in [Appendix A.11](#)). Correctness, completeness, double-efficiency, and extraction are identical to that of [Construction 2](#), and we refer the reader to [Theorems 7](#) and [8](#) for more details.

Theorem 10. Let $s_p(\lambda) = s_p$, $s_q(\lambda) = s_q$, $p, q, \Pi_{\text{MHF}}, \Pi_{\text{VDS}}$, and H as defined in [Construction 3](#). For every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $d \in \mathbb{N}$, $u \in \mathbb{N}$, $c \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $c < d(u \cdot s_p - s_q)$, under the

- the existence of an (ϵ_{PRF}) -secure $\Pi_{\text{PRF}} = (\text{KGen}_{\text{PRF}}, \text{F}_{\text{PRF}})$ scheme supporting inputs of arbitrary (polynomial) size and output space $\{0, 1\}^{d \cdot s_p}$ ([Definition 9](#)),³⁵
- $(\epsilon_{\text{MHF}}, \sigma_{\text{MHF}}, n_{\text{MHF}})$ -multi-instance-security of Π_{MHF} ([Definition 2](#)), and
- (ϵ_{VDS}) -soundness of Π_{VDS} ([Definition 15](#)),

then Π of [Construction 2](#) satisfies $(\epsilon, \sigma_{\text{MHF}}, n, u)$ -replication ([Definition 20](#)) in the ROM, for $n = \min\{u \cdot n_{\text{MHF}}, d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c\}$ and $\epsilon = \epsilon_{\text{PRF}} + q_{\text{H}} \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}} + \frac{u}{|\mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}|} + u \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VDS}} + \frac{d-1}{|\mathbb{Z}_q|} + \frac{1}{2^c}$, where q_{H} is the number of queries submitted to the RO H .

Both arguments of the minimum function $\min u \cdot n_{\text{MHF}}, d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c = n$ (as specified in [Theorem 10](#)) scale with u . This allows [Construction 3](#) to enforce the same replication of [Construction 2](#) even if the number of messages u is unbounded. We report the formal corollary whose proof appears in [Appendix A.12](#).

Corollary 7. There exists a PoRep scheme as defined in [Corollary 6](#) where its $(\text{negl}(\lambda), \sigma, n, u)$ -replication holds for every (unbounded) $u \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

³⁴For correct decoding, the j identifiers must match those used during the execution of **Encode**, including id_k associated with m_k , which generated the encoding c_k . Additionally, it is implicitly assumed that k is known during the decoding process.

³⁵A PRF with input space $\{0, 1\}^n$ can be generically transformed into one supporting inputs of arbitrary (polynomial) length by using a Merkle tree evaluation-style.

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A Supporting Proofs

A.1 Proof of [Theorem 2](#)

Fix $u \in \mathbb{N}$ and $c \leq d(u \cdot s_p - s_q)$. Assume there exists a PPT adversary $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2)$ such that

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{A}_2(1^\lambda, x, \alpha) = (f_1(x), \dots, f_u(x)) \wedge \\ |\alpha| \leq d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} (f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)) \leftarrow \mathbf{F}_{d-1,p}^u, \\ \alpha \leftarrow \mathbf{A}_1(1^\lambda, f_1, \dots, f_u), \\ x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \end{array} \right] > \frac{d-1}{|\mathbb{Z}_q|} + \frac{1}{2^c} = \epsilon. \quad (2)$$

Fix $(f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)) \leftarrow \mathbf{F}_{d-1,p}^u$, $\alpha \leftarrow \mathbf{A}_1(1^\lambda, f_1, \dots, f_u)$, and the random coins $r_2 \in \{0, 1\}^*$ of $\mathbf{A}_2$. Let $\mathcal{X}_{f_1, \dots, f_u, \alpha, r_2}$ be the set of points for which the adversary $\mathbf{A}_2$, on input $(1^\lambda, \alpha)$ and random coins r_2 , is able to correctly compute $(f_1(x), \dots, f_u(x))$, i.e.,

$$\mathcal{X}_{f_1, \dots, f_u, \alpha, r_2} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{x : x \in \mathbb{Z}_q \text{ such that } (f_1(x), \dots, f_u(x)) = \mathbf{A}_2(1^\lambda, x, \alpha; r_2)\}.$$

It is easy to see that $\frac{|\mathcal{X}_{f_1, \dots, f_u, \alpha, r_2}|}{|\mathbb{Z}_q|} > \epsilon$; otherwise, [Equation \(2\)](#) does not hold. Hence, we have that $|\mathcal{X}_{f_1, \dots, f_u, \alpha, r_2}| > \epsilon \cdot |\mathbb{Z}_q| = d - 1 + \frac{|\mathbb{Z}_q|}{2^c} > d - 1$. This means that $\mathcal{X}_{f_1, \dots, f_u, \alpha, r_2} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_q$ contains at least d distinct points with probability ϵ where the probability is taken over choices of $(f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)) \leftarrow \mathbf{F}_{d-1,p}^u$, $\alpha \leftarrow \mathbf{A}_1(1^\lambda, f_1, \dots, f_u)$, and random coins $r_2 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*$.

We leverage this observation to build an adversary $\mathbf{A}' = (\mathbf{A}'_1, \mathbf{A}'_2)$ that contradicts the $(c, \frac{1}{2^c})$ -incompressibility of $\mathbf{U}_{u \cdot d \cdot s_p}$ ([Theorem 1](#)). Without loss of generality, we assume that both $\mathbf{A}'_1$ and $\mathbf{A}'_2$ have hardcoded $r_2 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*$. $\mathbf{A}' = (\mathbf{A}'_1, \mathbf{A}'_2)$ are defined as follows:

$\mathbf{A}'_1(1^\lambda, a)$: On input the security parameter 1^λ and string $a = (a_0, \dots, a_{u \cdot d - 1}) \in \{0, 1\}^{u \cdot d \cdot s_p}$, $\mathbf{A}'_1$ proceeds as follows:

1. Compute $\alpha \leftarrow \mathbf{A}_1(1^\lambda, f_1, \dots, f_u)$ where $f_j(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} a_{j \cdot d + i} \cdot X^i \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ for every $j \in \{0\} \cup [u - 1]$.
2. Compute (in time $|\mathbb{Z}_q|$) the set $\mathcal{X}_{f_1, \dots, f_u, \alpha, r_2}$. Note that this is possible since $\mathbf{A}'_1$ is unbounded and has r_2 hardcoded.
3. Output $\alpha' = (\alpha, x_1, \dots, x_d)$ where $x_1, \dots, x_d \in \mathcal{X}_{f_1, \dots, f_u, \alpha, r_2}$.

$\mathbf{A}'_2(1^\lambda, \alpha')$: On input the security parameter 1^λ and $\alpha' = (\alpha, x_1, \dots, x_d)$, $\mathbf{A}'_2$ proceeds as follows:

1. For every $i \in [d]$, compute $(y_{i,1}, \dots, y_{i,u}) \leftarrow \mathbf{A}_2(1^\lambda, x_i, \alpha; r_2)$.
2. For every $j \in \{0\} \cup [u - 1]$, compute $(a_{j \cdot d}, \dots, a_{j \cdot d + d - 1})$ using Lagrange interpolation over the evaluations $y_{1,j}, \dots, y_{d,j}$ and the points $x_1, \dots, x_d$ (recall that p is of size $(s_p + 1)$. This guarantees that each a_i of size s_p can be correctly reconstructed).
3. Output $a = (a_0, \dots, a_{u \cdot d - 1})$.

First, it is easy to see that $\mathbf{A}'_1$ outputs a string α' of the correct size since

$$|\alpha'| = |\alpha| + |x_1| + \dots + |x_d| \leq d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c + d \cdot s_q = u \cdot d \cdot s_p - c.$$

Second, we know that $\mathcal{X}_{f_1, \dots, f_u, \alpha, r_2}$ contains d points with probability ϵ and, by definition of $\mathcal{X}_{f_1, \dots, f_u, \alpha, r_2}$, the evaluations $(y_{1,j}, \dots, y_{d,j})_{j \in [u]}$ are correct, i.e., $y_{i,j} = f_j(x_i)$ for every $i \in [d]$ and for every $j \in [u]$. Since $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)$ are all univariate polynomials of degree $d - 1$, the Lagrange interpolation correctly reconstructs the corresponding coefficients of each polynomial. In turn, this implies that $\mathbf{A}'_2$ outputs the correct string $a = (a_0, \dots, a_{u \cdot d - 1})$. Hence, $\mathbf{A}' = (\mathbf{A}'_1, \mathbf{A}'_2)$ retains the same advantage of $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2)$ which is greater than $\frac{1}{2^c}$ (independently from the choices of d and q . See [Equation \(2\)](#)). This concludes the proof.

A.2 Proof of **Corollary 4**

The corollary follows by setting $c = c(\lambda) = \lambda$, $s_p = s_p(\lambda) = \lambda^{1+\delta}$, $s_q = s_q(\lambda) = \lambda$, and observing that $\frac{d-1}{|\mathbb{Z}_q|} \leq \frac{\text{poly}(\lambda)}{2^\lambda} \in O(\frac{1}{2^\lambda})$, $\frac{1}{2^c} = \frac{1}{2^\lambda}$, and

$$\begin{aligned} |\alpha| &\leq d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c = d \cdot u \cdot s_p - (d \cdot s_q + c) = d \cdot u \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta} - (d \cdot \lambda + \lambda) \\ &= d \cdot u \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta} - (d+1) \cdot \lambda. \end{aligned}$$

A.3 Proof of **Theorem 3**

This proof relies on the oracle abstraction defined in **Definition 10**. This is because, the localized version $\text{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)$ of a deterministic RAM algorithm $\text{T}^{[x]}(y)$ is essentially the execution of $\text{T}^{[\cdot]}(y)$ where the (oracle) RAM accessible input (denoted as $[\cdot]$) is simulated by $\text{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)$ using its oracle access to both x' and map , and intercepting the all (read, i) read commands issued by $\text{T}^{[\cdot]}(y)$ (as defined in **Definition 10**).

Formally, consider the following construction.

Construction 4. Let T be a deterministic RAM algorithm. We build the localized version Local.T of T as follows.

Local.T^{[x'], [map]}(y): On input an arbitrary binary string $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$, a RAM accessible input $x' = (x'_1, \dots, x'_{k'})$, and a RAM accessible memory mapping $\text{map} = (i'_1, \dots, i'_{k'})$, the localized deterministic RAM algorithm Local.T executes $\text{T}^{[\cdot]}(y)$ (the notation $[\cdot]$ indicates that Local.T will simulate the access to the read-only RAM input) and, until T stops or it outputs a value v , it proceeds as follows:

1. When T submits a read command (read, i_j) , Local.T leverages its read-only RAM access to map to execute a binary search over map to identify the index c which is the location of i_j into map . If such an index c does not exist (i.e., $i_j \notin \text{map}$), Local.T outputs $\perp$ and terminates.
2. Local.T sends the read command (read, c) to $[x']$ and receives x'_c as a result. Then, Local.T returns x'_c to T as the answer of the read command (read, i_j) .
3. Local.T waits for the next read command of T and re-executes **Items 1 to 3**.

Finally, Local.T outputs the same value v output by $\text{T}^{[\cdot]}(y)$.

We now demonstrate that Local.T of **Construction 4** satisfies perfect correctness and invalid mapping. Lastly, we demonstrate the running time of Local.T .

Lemma 1. The localized version Local.T (**Construction 4**) of the deterministic RAM algorithm T is perfectly correct (**Definition 12**).

Proof. Fix the read-only accessible input $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and an arbitrary binary input of T . Also, consider $\mathcal{I}_{x,y}$, k' , map , and $x' = (x'_1, \dots, x'_{k'})$ as defined in the perfect correctness property of **Definition 12**. Then, we have the following conditions:

1. map is ordered, i.e., $\forall j \in [k']$ then $i'_j < i'_{j+1}$,
2. $\forall i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ then $i_j \in \text{map}$,
3. $\forall i'_j \in \text{map}$ if $i'_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ then $x'_j = x_{i'_j}$.

From **Item 1**, we conclude that **Local.T** of **Construction 4** can correctly execute the binary search on **map**. Moreover, by definition, **T** will submit only read commands (read, i_j) such that $i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$. In turn, by combining the above with **Item 2**, we conclude that **Local.T** will never return $\perp$ since i_j will be in **map**. Let c be the index of i_j (of the read command (read, i_j)) identified by **Local.T** after running the binary search on **map**. By leveraging, **Item 3** we have that $x'_c = x_{i_j}$ which is the correct value expected by **T**. Hence, it must be that $\mathsf{T}^{[x]}(y) = v = \mathsf{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)$. This concludes the proof. $\square$

Lemma 2. *The localized version **Local.T** (**Construction 4**) of the deterministic RAM algorithm **T** satisfies the invalid mapping property (**Definition 12**).*

Proof. Fix the read-only accessible input $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and an arbitrary binary input of **T**. Also, consider $\mathcal{I}_{x,y}$, k' , **map**, and $x' = (x'_1, \dots, x'_{k'})$ as defined in the invalid mapping property of **Definition 12**. Then, we have the following conditions:

1. **map** is ordered, i.e., $\forall j \in [k']$ then $i'_j < i'_{j+1}$,
2. $\exists i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ such that $i_j \notin \text{map}$,
3. $\forall i'_j \in \text{map}$ then $x'_j = x_{i'_j}$.

As usual, **Item 1** implies that **Local.T** of **Construction 4** can correctly execute the binary search on **map**. Moreover, by definition, **T** will submit only read commands (read, i_j) such that $i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$. Now, fix a generic m -th read command (read, i_j) submitted by **T**. We can identify the following two cases:

- If $i_j \in \text{map}$ then **Local.T** will return x'_c to **T** as the answer of the read command (read, i_j) where c is the index of i_j identified by **Local.T** (after running the binary search on **map**). By leveraging, **Item 3**, we have $x'_c = x_{i_j}$ which is precisely the value that **T** expects to see. Hence, the computation of **T** and **Local.T** can continue as expected.
- If $i_j \notin \text{map}$ (note that $i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ also holds since, by definition, **T** will only submit read commands (read, i_j) such that $i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$) then the binary search, executed by **Local.T**, will not find an index c . In turn, **Local.T** will output $\perp$ and terminate. Observe that this case must happen (i.e., there exists an m' -th read command query (read, i_j) such that $i_j \notin \text{map}$) since we know that $\exists i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,y}$ such that $i_j \notin \text{map}$ (**Item 2**).

By combining the above observations, we conclude that $\mathsf{Local.T}^{[x']}(y)$ will output $\perp$. This concludes the proof. $\square$

Lemma 3. *For every read-only RAM accessible input x , arbitrary binary input y , read-only RAM accessible input x' , and read-only RAM accessible memory mapping **map**, the running time of $\mathsf{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)$ (**Construction 4**) is at most $t \cdot \log(|\text{map}|)$ where t is the running time of $\mathsf{T}^{[x]}(y)$. Running times of both **T** and **Local.T** are measured in the RAM model of computation.*

Proof. Assume that the running time of $\mathsf{T}^{[x]}(y)$ is t in the RAM model of computation. This implies that $\mathsf{T}^{[x]}(y)$ submits at most t read command queries to its read-only RAM accessible input x . Without loss of generality, assume $\mathsf{T}^{[x]}(y)$ only submits read command queries and does not perform any internal computation (this is fine to assume since $\mathsf{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)$ will produce an overhead only when a read command query is submitted by $\mathsf{T}^{[x]}(y)$). For every read command query submitted by $\mathsf{T}^{[x]}(y)$, $\mathsf{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)$ executes a binary search over **map** which requires (worst-case) time $\log(|\text{map}|)$ in the RAM model of computation. Hence, the overall running time of $\mathsf{Local.T}^{[x'], [\text{map}]}(y)$ will be at most $t \cdot \log(|\text{map}|)$. $\square$

Theorem 3 follows by combining **Lemmas 1** to **3**.

A.4 Proof of Theorem 4

First, regarding perfect correctness of Π , the value y , output by $\text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x, D, \text{aux})$, is computed as $y = \text{Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, D)$ where $D = \text{GenData}_{\text{DS}}(f, p)$. As a consequence, perfect correctness of Π simply follows from the perfect correctness of Π_{DS} .

Second, regarding perfect completeness of Π , fix an honestly generated output (y, π) produced by $\text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x, D, \text{aux})$ where $\pi = (\mathcal{I}_{x,D}, \{\pi_j\}_{j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,D}})$ as defined in Construction 1 (recall that $\mathcal{I}_{x,D}$ is the ordered set of indexes read from the data structure D during the RAM computation $\text{Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, D)$). See Item 1). On verification, $\text{Verify}(\text{pp}, h, x, \pi)$ proceeds as follows:

1. It checks $|\mathcal{I}_{x,D}| \leq \ell$ and $\mathcal{I}_{x,D} = \{i_1, \dots, i_k\}$ is an ordered set. If $\text{Eval}(\text{pp}, x, D, \text{aux})$ is honestly executed then these conditions hold by definition (observe that D is composed of ℓ blocks so $\mathcal{I}_{x,D}$ cannot be bigger than ℓ).
2. It computes $\text{Verify}_{\text{VC}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VC}}, c, D_j, j, \pi_j) = b_j$ for $j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,D}$. Since Π_{VC} is perfectly correct, we have that $b_j = 1$ for every $j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,D}$.
3. It executes $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, (D_{i_1}, \dots, D_{i_k}), \text{map}) = y'$ where $\mathcal{I}_{x,D} = \{i_1, \dots, i_k\}$ and $\text{map} = (i_1, \dots, i_k)$. By definition, we have that $\mathcal{I}_{x,D} = \{i_1, \dots, i_k\}$ is the ordered set of indexes read from x during the computation $\text{Eval}_{\text{DS}}(\text{pp}, x, D)$. Hence, we conclude that $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, (D_{i_1}, \dots, D_{i_k}), \text{map}) = y' = y = \text{Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, D)$ by leveraging the perfect correctness of the localized computation $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}$ of Eval_{DS} (see Definition 12).

Observe that the final output of $\text{Verify}(\text{pp}, h, x, \pi)$ is 1 if $y' = y$ and $b_j = 1$ for every $j \in \mathcal{I}_{x,D}$. Hence, by combining the two above observations, we conclude that Π is perfectly complete.

A.5 Proof of Theorem 5

Suppose that Π is not $(\ell \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VC}})$ -sound, i.e, there exists a valid PPT adversary A such that

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{Verify}(\text{pp}, h, \tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi}) = 1 \wedge \\ \tilde{y} \neq f(\tilde{x}) \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} \text{pp} \leftarrow \$ \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ (\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi}, f, p) \leftarrow \$ A(1^\lambda, \text{pp}) \\ (D, h, \text{aux}) = \text{GenData}(\text{pp}, f, p) \end{array} \right] > \ell \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VC}}. \quad (3)$$

Fix the output $(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi})$ of A where $\tilde{\pi} = (\tilde{\mathcal{I}}, \{\tilde{D}_1, \dots, \tilde{D}_n\}, \{\tilde{\pi}_1, \dots, \tilde{\pi}_n\})$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{I}} = \{\tilde{i}_1, \dots, \tilde{i}_n\}$. Through the proof, we assume the following:

1. $n \leq \ell \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{I}}$ is an ordered set; otherwise, the verification $\text{Verify}(\text{pp}, h, \tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi})$ would output 0, contradicting Equation (3) (see Construction 1).
2. $p \in \mathbb{N}$ is a prime and $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$. This is because A is valid with respect to Definition 15.

Lemma 4. *For every $j \in [n]$, the following probability holds:*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{Verify}_{\text{VC}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VC}}, c, \tilde{D}_j, \tilde{i}_j, \tilde{\pi}_j) = 1 \wedge \\ \tilde{D}_{\tilde{i}_j} \neq \tilde{D}_j \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} \text{pp} \leftarrow \$ \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ (\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi}, f, p) \leftarrow \$ A(1^\lambda, \text{pp}) \\ (D, h, \text{aux}) = \text{GenData}(\text{pp}, f, p) \end{array} \right] \leq \epsilon_{\text{VC}},$$

where $\tilde{\pi} = (\tilde{\mathcal{I}}, \{\tilde{D}_1, \dots, \tilde{D}_n\}, \{\tilde{\pi}_1, \dots, \tilde{\pi}_n\})$, $\tilde{\mathcal{I}} = \{\tilde{i}_1, \dots, \tilde{i}_n\}$, $h = c$, $\text{pp} = \text{pp}_{\text{VC}}$, and $D = (D_1, \dots, D_\ell)$.

Proof. Suppose that the above probability does not hold. We build a PPT adversary A_{VC} that breaks the (ϵ_{VC}) -positional binding of Π_{VC} . A_{VC} proceeds as follows:

1. Receive pp_{VC} from the challenger.
2. Send pp_{VC} to A.
3. Receive $(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi}, f, p)$ from A where $\tilde{\pi} = (\tilde{\mathcal{I}}, \{\tilde{D}_1, \dots, \tilde{D}_n\}, \{\tilde{\pi}_1, \dots, \tilde{\pi}_n\})$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{I}} = \{\tilde{i}_1, \dots, \tilde{i}_n\}$.
4. Compute $(D, h, \text{aux}) = \text{GenData}(\text{pp}_{\text{VC}}, f, p)$ where $D = (D_1, \dots, D_\ell)$.
5. Output $(h, D_{\tilde{i}_j}, \tilde{D}_j, \tilde{i}_j, \pi_{\tilde{i}_j}, \tilde{\pi}_j)$ where $\pi_{\tilde{i}_j} = \text{Open}_{\text{VC}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VC}}, D_{\tilde{i}_j}, \tilde{i}_j, \text{aux})$.

It is easy to see that A_{VC} correctly simulates the view of A. Conditioned to a correct simulation, we observe the following:

1. $\text{Verify}_{\text{VC}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VC}}, h, D_{\tilde{i}_j}, \tilde{i}_j, \pi_{\tilde{i}_j}) = 1$ where $h = c = \text{Commit}_{\text{VC}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VC}}, (D_1, \dots, D_\ell))$. This follows from the perfect correctness of Π_{VC} .
2. $\text{Verify}_{\text{VC}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VC}}, h, \tilde{D}_j, \tilde{i}_j, \tilde{\pi}_j) = 1$ and $D_{\tilde{i}_j} \neq \tilde{D}_j$ with probability at least ϵ_{VC} . This because, by definition, A has an advantage ϵ_{VC} in outputting $(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi}, f, p)$ such that $\text{Verify}_{\text{VC}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VC}}, c, \tilde{D}_j, \tilde{i}_j, \tilde{\pi}_j) = 1$ and $D_{\tilde{i}_j} \neq \tilde{D}_j$.

By combining the above observations, we conclude that A_{VC} breaks positional binding with probability greater than ϵ_{VC} . This concludes the proof. $\square$

Lemma 5. *The following probability holds:*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}(\tilde{x}, (D'_1, \dots, D'_n), \text{map}) = \perp : \begin{array}{l} \text{pp} \leftarrow \$ \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), \\ (\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi}, f, p) \leftarrow \$ A(1^\lambda, \text{pp}), \\ (D, h, \text{aux}) = \text{GenData}(\text{pp}, f, p), \\ \exists i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{D, \tilde{x}} \text{ s.t. } i_j \notin \text{map} \end{array} \right] = 1,$$

where $\mathcal{I}_{D, \tilde{x}} = \{i_1, \dots, i_k\}$ is the set of ordered indexes read from x during the (honestly executed) deterministic RAM computation $\text{Eval}_{\text{DS}}(\tilde{x}, D)$, $\tilde{\pi} = (\tilde{\mathcal{I}}, \{\tilde{D}_1, \dots, \tilde{D}_n\}, \{\tilde{\pi}_1, \dots, \tilde{\pi}_n\})$, $\tilde{\mathcal{I}} = \{\tilde{i}_1, \dots, \tilde{i}_n\}$, $h = c$, $\text{pp} = \text{pp}_{\text{VC}}$, $\text{map} = (\tilde{i}_1, \dots, \tilde{i}_n)$, and $(D'_1, \dots, D'_n) = (D_{\tilde{i}_1}, \dots, D_{\tilde{i}_n})$.

Proof. Observe that the following conditions hold:

- map is ordered since it is computed from $\tilde{\mathcal{I}}$ which in turn is an ordered set; otherwise, $\text{Verify}(\text{pp}, h, \tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi})$ would output 0, contradicting Equation (3).
- By definition, Lemma 5 assumes that $\exists i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{D, \tilde{x}}$ such that $i_j \notin \text{map}$.
- By definition, Lemma 5 assumes that $\forall \tilde{i}_j \in \text{map}$ we have $D'_j = D_{\tilde{i}_j}$.

By leveraging the above conditions, the Lemma 5 follows by using the invalid mapping property (Definition 12) of the localized deterministic RAM algorithm $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}$ of Eval_{DS} . $\square$

Lemma 6. *The following probability holds:*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}(\tilde{x}, (D'_1, \dots, D'_n), \text{map}) = f(\tilde{x}) : \begin{array}{l} \text{pp} \leftarrow \$ \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ (\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi}, f, p) \leftarrow \$ A(1^\lambda, \text{pp}) \\ (D, h, \text{aux}) = \text{GenData}(\text{pp}, f, p) \\ \nexists i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{D, \tilde{x}} \text{ s.t. } i_j \notin \text{map} \end{array} \right] = 1,$$

where $\mathcal{I}_{D, \tilde{x}} = \{i_1, \dots, i_k\}$ is the set of ordered indexes read from x during the (honestly executed) deterministic RAM computation $\text{Eval}_{\text{DS}}(\tilde{x}, D)$, $\tilde{\pi} = (\tilde{\mathcal{I}}, \{\tilde{D}_1, \dots, \tilde{D}_n\}, \{\tilde{\pi}_1, \dots, \tilde{\pi}_n\})$, $\tilde{\mathcal{I}} = \{\tilde{i}_1, \dots, \tilde{i}_n\}$, $h = c$, $\text{pp} = \text{pp}_{\text{VC}}$, $\text{map} = (\tilde{i}_1, \dots, \tilde{i}_n)$, and $(D'_1, \dots, D'_n) = (D_{\tilde{i}_1}, \dots, D_{\tilde{i}_n})$.

Proof. Observe that the following conditions hold:

- **map** is ordered since it is computed from $\tilde{\mathcal{I}}$ which in turn is an ordered set; otherwise, $\text{Verify}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{h}, \tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi})$ would output 0, contradicting Equation (3).
- By definition, Lemma 6 assumes that $\nexists i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{\mathbf{D}, \tilde{x}}$ such that $i_j \notin \text{map}$ (or equivalently $\forall i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{\mathbf{D}, \tilde{x}}$ we have $i_j \in \text{map}$).
- By definition, Lemma 6 assumes that $\forall \tilde{i}_j \in \text{map}$ we have $\mathbf{D}'_j = \mathbf{D}_{\tilde{i}_j}$. Moreover, in combination with the above condition, we can also conclude that $\forall \tilde{i}_j \in \text{map}$ we have if $\tilde{i}_j \in \mathcal{I}_{\mathbf{D}, \tilde{x}}$ then $\mathbf{D}'_j = \mathbf{D}_{\tilde{i}_j}$.

By leveraging the above conditions, Lemma 6 follows by using the perfect correctness (Definition 12) of the localized deterministic RAM algorithm $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}$ of Eval_{DS} . $\square$

To conclude the proof of Theorem 5, we need to observe the following:

1. By leveraging ℓ times Lemma 4, we conclude that $\exists j \in [n]$ such that $\mathbf{D}_{\tilde{i}_j} \neq \tilde{\mathbf{D}}_j$ with probability at most $\ell \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VC}}$. By combining this observation with Equation (3), we obtain that $(\mathbf{D}_{\tilde{i}_1}, \dots, \mathbf{D}_{\tilde{i}_n}) = (\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\mathbf{D}}_n)$.
2. Conditioned to $(\mathbf{D}_{\tilde{i}_1}, \dots, \mathbf{D}_{\tilde{i}_n}) = (\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\mathbf{D}}_n)$, if $\exists i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{\mathbf{D}, \tilde{x}}$ such that $i_j \notin \tilde{\mathcal{I}}$, then also **map** (computed by the verification algorithm Verify) is such that $\exists i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{\mathbf{D}, \tilde{x}}$ where $\tilde{i}_j \notin \text{map}$ (this is because **map** is computed from $\tilde{\mathcal{I}}$). In turn, by leveraging Lemma 5 we conclude that the localized deterministic RAM computation $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}$ (of Eval_{DS}) will output $y' = \perp$. By definition, this can not happen since $y' = \perp \neq f(\tilde{x})$ and, in turn, this would require $\text{Verify}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{h}, \tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi})$ to output 0, contradicting Equation (3). Hence, it must be that $\nexists i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{\mathbf{D}, \tilde{x}}$ such that $i_j \notin \tilde{\mathcal{I}}$.
3. On the other hand, conditioned to $(\mathbf{D}_{\tilde{i}_1}, \dots, \mathbf{D}_{\tilde{i}_n}) = (\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\mathbf{D}}_n)$, if $\nexists i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{\mathbf{D}, \tilde{x}}$ such that $i_j \notin \tilde{\mathcal{I}}$, then also **map** (computed by the verification algorithm Verify) is such that $\nexists i_j \in \mathcal{I}_{\mathbf{D}, \tilde{x}}$ where $\tilde{i}_j \notin \text{map}$ (this is because **map** is computed from $\tilde{\mathcal{I}}$). Similarly to the previous case, by leveraging Lemma 5 we conclude that the localized deterministic RAM algorithm $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}$ (of Eval_{DS}) will output $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}(\tilde{x}, (\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\mathbf{D}}_n), \text{map}) = y' = f(\tilde{x}) = \text{Eval}_{\text{DS}}(\tilde{x}, \mathbf{D})$. Finally, $\text{Verify}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{h}, \tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{\pi}) = 1$ (as defined in Equation (3)) implies that $y = y'$. Hence, we conclude that $y = f(\tilde{x})$ which contradicts Equation (3) (which says $y \neq f(\tilde{x})$).

Theorem 5 follows from the combination of Items 1 to 3 above (which in turn they leverage Lemmas 4 to 6).

A.6 Proof of Corollary 5

By leveraging Corollary 3 we have that the size $|\mathbf{D}|$ of $\mathbf{D}$ (output by GenData) is $|f(X)| \cdot \gamma_{\text{DS}}$, where $\gamma_{\text{DS}} = (d+1)^\delta \log^{o(1)}(p)$. In addition, Corollary 2 implies that $|\text{aux}| = \ell \cdot z = |f(X)| \cdot \gamma_{\text{DS}}$ since $\ell = \ell(d)$ corresponds to the number of blocks of $\mathbf{D}$ when each block (of $\mathbf{D}$) is of size z (see Construction 1). Finally, by leveraging Theorem 6 we conclude that

$$\gamma = \gamma_{\text{DS}} + \frac{|\text{aux}|}{|f(X)|} = 2 \cdot \gamma_{\text{DS}} = 2(d+1)^\delta \log^{o(1)}(p).$$

Regarding the size of digest, we can observe that $\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{c}$ and $|\mathbf{c}| = \lambda$ (see Corollary 2) where $\mathbf{c}$ is generated by Π_{VC} .

A.7 Proof of Theorem 6

We prove each efficiency property individually.

(γ)-expansion: This property is straightforward. Since $|\mathbf{D}| = |f(X)| \cdot \gamma_{\text{DS}} + |\text{aux}|$, we obtain that

$$\gamma = \frac{|\mathbf{D}| + |\text{aux}|}{|f(X)|} = \gamma_{\text{DS}} + \frac{|\text{aux}|}{|f(X)|},$$

where γ_{DS} is the expansion factor of the underlying Π_{DS} and aux is the auxiliary information output by Π_{VC} .

Efficient of evaluation and verification: As for evaluation, we can observe that **Eval** proceeds as follows:

1. It executes $\text{Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, \mathbf{D})$ and computes the ordered set of indexes $\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}$. Since Π_{DS} is efficient (see Definition 7), we obtain that both $\text{Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, \mathbf{D})$ and the computation of $\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}$ requires time $\text{poly}(\log(d), \log(p))$. Observe that the running time for computing $\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}$ holds since $\text{Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, \mathbf{D})$ runs in time $\text{poly}(\log(d), \log(p))$ which, in turn, is an upper-bound on the number of indexes read. In addition, ordering $\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}$ has a logarithmic multiplicate overhead which is absorbed by the asymptotic notation $\text{poly}(\log(d), \log(p))$.
2. It computes $|\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}| \in \text{poly}(\log(d), \log(p))$ openings π_j by executing $|\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}|$ times the opening algorithm Open_{VC} . Since Π_{VC} is efficient (Definition 3), computing these $|\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}|$ openings requires time $\text{poly}(\lambda, \log(d), \log(p))$.³⁶

On the other hand, as for verification, **Verify** proceeds as follows:

1. It checks that $|\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}| \leq \ell$ and that $\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}$ is ordered. Since $\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}$ is upper-bounded by the (worst-case) running time of Eval_{DS} , we conclude that these steps require (worst-case) time $\text{poly}(\log(d), \log(p))$.
2. It executes $|\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}|$ times the verification algorithm $\text{Verify}_{\text{VC}}$. As usual Π_{VC} is efficient. Thus, the overall (worst-case) running time of this step is $\text{poly}(\lambda, \log(d), \log(p))$.
3. Finally, it executes the localized computation $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}(x, (\mathbf{D}_{i_1}, \dots, \mathbf{D}_{i_k}), \text{map})$ where $|\text{map}| = |\mathcal{I}_{x, \mathbf{D}}| \in \text{poly}(\log(d), \log(p))$ since Eval_{DS} runs in time $\text{poly}(\log(d), \log(p))$. By combining Theorem 3 with the above observation, we have that the localized RAM algorithm $\text{Local.Eval}_{\text{DS}}$ has (worst-case) running time $\text{poly}(\log(d), \log(p))$.

To conclude, the (worst-case) running times of both **Eval** and **Verify** are $\text{poly}(\lambda, \log(d), \log(p))$ in the RAM model of computation.

This implies that Construction 1 is doubly-efficient.

A.8 Proof of Theorem 8

Consider the following extractor $\text{Ext}^{\text{A}_3(\cdot)}$ (with oracle access to A_3 as defined in experiment $\mathbf{G}_{\text{A}, \Pi, \text{Ext}}^{\text{extract}}(\lambda, t, n, u)$ of Definition 22):

$\text{Ext}^{\text{A}_3(\cdot)}(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, (h_i, \text{id}_i)_{i \in [u]}):$ On input the security parameter 1^λ , the public encoding key $\text{ek} = (\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}})$, the public verification key $\text{vk} = \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}$, u pairs of digests and identifiers

³⁶Recall that $\ell = \ell(d)$ is a polynomial function that depends on d . Thus, $\log(\ell) = O(\log(d))$.

$(h_i, \text{id}_i)_{i \in [u]}$ (each corresponding to a message m_i that Ext needs to extract), and oracle access to the adversary $A_3(\cdot)$,³⁷ the extractor proceeds as follows:

1. Initialize $y_{i,j} = \perp$ for every $i \in [u]$ and $j \in [d]$.
2. For every $j \in [d]$ and for every $q \in [\text{trials}]$ where $\text{trials}(\lambda) \in \omega(\log(\lambda))$ (note that trials depends on the security parameter λ):
 - (a) Send $\text{chall}_{j,q} \leftarrow \mathcal{C}$ to A_3 and receive the answer $(\pi_{i,j,q})_{i \in [u]}$ where $\pi_{i,j,q} = (y_{i,j,q}, \pi'_{i,j,q})$ (recall that A_3 will reply with u proofs, one for each message).
 - (b) If $\text{Verify}(\text{vk}, h_i, \text{chall}_{j,q}, \pi_{i,j,q}) = 1$ for every $i \in [u]$, set $y_{i,j} = y_{i,j,q}$ and $x_j = \text{chall}_{j,q}$ for every $i \in [u]$.
3. If $\exists i \in [u]$ and $j \in [d]$ such that $y_{i,j} = \perp$, the extractor aborts and outputs $\perp$.
4. For every $i \in [u]$, use Lagrange interpolation over the points $(x_j)_{j \in [d]}$ and the evaluations $(y_{i,j})_{j \in [d]}$ to compute $f'_i(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$.
5. Finally, return $(m'_1, \dots, m'_u)$ where $m_i = f'_i(X) \oplus H(\text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i), \text{id}_i)$ for $i \in [u]$.

It is easy to see that the extractor runs in polynomial-time since $u \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $d \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$, and $\text{trials} = \omega(\log(\lambda))$.

We now prove the following lemmas with respect to $A_3(\cdot)$ and the aforementioned extractor $\text{Ext}^{A_3(\cdot)}$.

Lemma 7. *For every PPT adversary $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ we have*

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbf{G}_{A,\Pi}^{\text{replicate}}(\lambda, t, n, u) = 1\right] \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\lambda)} \implies \mathbb{P}\left[\text{Ext}^{A_3(\cdot)}(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{vk}, (h_i, \text{id}_i)_{i \in [u]}) \neq \perp\right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Proof. Let $\nu(\lambda)$ be a non-negligible probability such that

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbf{G}_{A,\Pi}^{\text{replicate}}(\lambda, t, n, u) = 1\right] \geq \nu(\lambda).$$

Recall that the above implies that the probability that A_3 returns at least one proof (among the u) that does not verify is at most $1 - \nu(\lambda)$ which, in turn, is non-negligible (this is because $\nu(\lambda)$ is non-negligible). The probability that $\text{Ext}^{A_3(\cdot)}(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{vk}, (h_i, \text{id}_i)_{i \in [u]}) = \perp$ is bounded as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}\left[\text{Ext}^{A_3(\cdot)}(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{vk}, (h_i, \text{id}_i)_{i \in [u]}) = \perp\right] &= \mathbb{P}[\exists i \in [u], \exists j \in [d], y_{i,j} = \perp] = \\ &= \mathbb{P}[\exists i \in [u], \exists j \in [d], \forall q \in [\text{trials}], \text{Verify}(\text{vk}, h_i, \text{chall}_{j,q}, \pi_{i,j,q}) = 0]. \end{aligned}$$

It is easy to see that the last probability is at most $(1 - \nu(\lambda))^{\text{trials}} = (1 - \nu(\lambda))^{\omega(\log(\lambda))}$ which is negligible. In turn, this implies that $\text{Ext}^{A_3(\cdot)}(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{vk}, (h_i, \text{id}_i)_{i \in [u]}) \neq \perp$ with probability at least $1 - (1 - \nu(\lambda))^{\omega(\log(\lambda))} = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$. This concludes the proof. $\square$

Lemma 8. $\mathbb{P}[\forall j_1 \in [d], \forall j_2 \in [d] \setminus \{j_1\}, x_{j_1} \neq x_{j_2}] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Proof. The lemma follows by simply observing that:

- for every $j \in [d]$, x_j corresponds to a randomly sampled challenge $\text{chall}_{j,q} \leftarrow \mathcal{C}$ (for some $q \in [\text{trials}]$), and

³⁷Recall that the extractor can only submit challenges to the adversary A_3 as defined in [Definition 22](#)

- $\mathcal{C} = \mathbb{Z}_q$ and q is a (s_q) -bits prime where $s_q \in \omega(\log(\lambda))$ (see [Item 1 of Construction 2](#)), then $|\mathcal{C}| = |\mathbb{Z}_q| = 2^{\omega(\log(\lambda))}$.

Since **Ext** runs in polynomial-time (i.e., it samples at most $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ challenges from $\mathcal{C}$) and $|\mathcal{C}|$ is of size super-polynomial in the security parameter λ , then the probability of sampling the same point twice (i.e., $\exists j_1 \in [d], \exists j_2 \in [d] \setminus \{j_1\}$ such that $x_{j_1} = x_{j_2}$) is negligible. This concludes the proof. $\square$

Lemma 9. *If Π_{VDS} is $(\text{negl}(\lambda))$ -sound then $\forall i \in [u], \forall j \in [d], \forall q \in \text{trials}$ we have*

$$\mathbb{P}[\text{Verify}(\text{vk}, h_i, \text{chall}_{j,q}, \pi_{i,j,q}) = 1 \wedge y_{i,j,q} \neq f_i(\text{chall}_{j,q})] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda), \quad (4)$$

where $f_i(X) = m_i \oplus \text{H}(\text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i), \text{id}_i)$ for every $i \in [u]$.

Proof. Observe that $\text{Verify}(\text{vk}, h_i, \text{chall}_{j,q}, \pi_{i,j,q}) = 1$ only if $\text{Verify}_{\text{VDS}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, h_i, \text{chall}_{j,q}, \pi'_{i,j,q}) = 1$ (see [Construction 2](#)). Thus, if there exists $i \in [u], j \in [d], q \in \text{trials}$ for which [Equation \(4\)](#) does not hold (i.e., the probability is non-negligible) then we would contradict the $(\text{negl}(\lambda))$ -soundness of Π_{VDS} (recall that $u, d \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $\text{trials} \in \omega(\log(\lambda))$). The proof is standard so we omit it (the proof is similar to that of [Lemma 14](#) of the proof of [Theorem 9](#)). $\square$

The lemmas above imply the following:

- By leveraging [Lemma 7](#), the extractor does not abort (i.e., it outputs $\perp$) with overwhelming probability. This also implies that for every $i \in [u]$, for every $j \in [d]$, we have $y_{i,j} \neq \perp$ and $\text{Verify}(\text{vk}, h_i, \text{chall}_{j,q}, \pi_{i,j,q}) = 1$ (for the corresponding $q \in \text{trials}$) where $\text{chall}_{j,q} = x_j$.
- Conditioned to the above, we have that $y_{i,j} = f_i(x_j)$ for every $i \in [u]$, for every $j \in [d]$ with overwhelming probability (this follows by leveraging [Lemma 9](#)).
- Lastly, by leveraging [Lemma 8](#) we have that points $(x_1, \dots, x_d)$ are all different with overwhelming probability ([Lemma 8](#)).

Hence, the above observations imply that the Lagrange interpolation (executed by **Ext**) computes the correct polynomial $f'_i(X) = f_i(X) = m_i \oplus \text{H}(\text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i), \text{id}_i)$. Thus, **Ext** correctly extracts the messages $(m'_1, \dots, m'_u) = (m_1, \dots, m_u)$ with overwhelming probability. This concludes the proof.

A.9 Proof of [Theorem 9](#)

Consider the following hybrid experiments (defined in the random oracle model):

H⁰(λ, t, n, u): This hybrid experiment is identical to the adaptive experiment $\mathbf{G}_{\text{A}, \Pi}^{\text{replicate}}(\lambda, t, n, u)$ of **PoRep**.

H¹(λ, t, n, u): Identical to **H⁰**(λ, t, n, u) except that the challenger simulates the majority of the random oracle queries using the PRF scheme Π_{PRF} . More in detail, the challenger computes $\mathbf{k} \leftarrow \text{KGen}_{\text{PRF}}(1^\lambda)$ and samples the u challenge random identifier $(\text{id}_1, \dots, \text{id}_u) \leftarrow \mathcal{I}^u$ in advance. Then, on input a query $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ for the random oracle $\text{H}(\cdot)$, the challenger proceeds as follows:

- If $v' \neq v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$ or $\text{id}' \neq \text{id}_i$ for every $i \in [u]$, the challenger returns $\text{F}_{\text{PRF}}(\mathbf{k}, (v', \text{id}'))$ (instead of a random value).
- Otherwise, if there exists $i \in [u]$ such that $v' = v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$ and $\text{id}' = \text{id}_i$, the challenger returns a random value $r' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{d \cdot s_p}$.

$\mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u)$: Identical to $\mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u)$ except that the challenger aborts if the adversary A_3 (i.e., the third adversary) submits the random oracle query $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v' = v_i = \text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$ for some $i \in [u]$, i.e., the challenger aborts if $(\text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i), \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Q}_{A_3, \text{H}}$ (for some id' and $i \in [u]$) where $\mathcal{Q}_{A_3, \text{H}}$ is the set of random oracle queries submitted by A_3 and id_i is the i -th challenge random identifier which is sampled at random from $\mathcal{I}$.³⁸ Observe that if A_1 and A_2 submit $(\text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i), \text{id}')$ (for some id' and $i \in [u]$) to the random oracle, the challenger does not abort.

$\mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u)$: Identical to $\mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u)$ except that the challenger aborts if the adversary A_1 (i.e., the first adversary) submits the random oracle query (v', id') such that $\text{id}' = \text{id}_i$ for some $i \in [u]$, i.e., the challenger aborts if $(v', \text{id}_i) \in \mathcal{Q}_{A_1, \text{H}}$ (for some v' and $i \in [u]$) where $\mathcal{Q}_{A_1, \text{H}}$ is the set of random oracle queries submitted by A_1 and id_i is the i -th challenge random identifier which is sampled at random from $\mathcal{I}$ in advance.

$\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$: Identical to $\mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u)$ except that the challenger changes its strategy for computing $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)$ and answering to the random oracle query (v', id') such that $v' = v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$ and $\text{id}' = \text{id}_i$ (for some $i \in [u]$), where id_i is the i -th challenge random identifier which is sampled in advance. More formally, let $\mathbf{F}_{d-1, p}^u$ (where p is a $(s_p + 1)$ -bits prime) be a distribution over univariate polynomials of degree $d - 1$ from $\mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ that samples u polynomials $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ as follows:

1. Sample $(a_0, \dots, a_{u \cdot d - 1}) \leftarrow \mathbf{U}_{u \cdot d \cdot s_p}$.
2. Return u univariate polynomials $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)$ such that $f_j(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} a_{j \cdot d + i} \cdot X^i$ for every $j \in [u - 1] \cup \{0\}$ (i.e., each binary string a_i is interpreted as an element of $\mathbb{Z}_p$).

The challenger proceeds as follows:

- The challenger samples $(\text{id}_1, \dots, \text{id}_u) \leftarrow \mathcal{I}^u$ and $(f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)) \leftarrow \mathbf{F}_{d-1, p}^u$.
- The challenger starts the experiment $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$.
- When $A_1(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk})$ outputs $(m_1, \dots, m_u, \beta)$, the challenger runs $v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$ and sets $\text{H}(v_i, \text{id}_i) = r_i = f_i(X) \oplus m_i$ for every $i \in [u]$.
- Then, the challenger continues the execution of $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$ which is identical to $\mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u)$ except that the challenger will use $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)$ and $\text{H}(v_1, \text{id}_1), \dots, \text{H}(v_u, \text{id}_u)$ programmed as described defined above.

$\mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u)$: Identical to $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$ except that the outcome of the experiment $\mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u)$ is set to 0 if there exists $i \in [u]$ such that $y_i \neq f_i(\text{chall})$ where $\pi_i = (y_i, \pi'_i)$ is the i -th proof output by the adversary A_3 .

Lemma 10. *If Π_{PRF} is (ϵ_{PRF}) -secure then*

$$\mathbf{H}^0(\lambda, t, n, u) \approx_{\epsilon_{\text{PRF}}} \mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u).$$

Proof. Assume there exists a PPT distinguisher $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ that distinguishes between $\mathbf{H}^0(\lambda, t, n, u)$ and $\mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u)$ with advantage greater than ϵ_{PRF} . Then, we build A_{PRF} that breaks the (ϵ_{PRF}) -security of Π_{PRF} . A_{PRF} is defined as follows:

1. Compute $(\text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n)$ where $\text{ek} = (\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}})$, $\text{pk} = \text{vk} = \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}$.

³⁸When the challenger decides to abort, the experiment continues as usual but the final outcome is set to 0.

2. For every $i \in [u]$, sample $\text{id}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$, $r_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{d \cdot s_p}$, and compute $v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$.
3. Execute $A_1(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk})$ and answer the incoming random oracle queries as follows:
 - (a) On input the random oracle query $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v_i \neq v'$ or $\text{id}_i \neq \text{id}'$ for every $i \in [u]$, A_{PRF} forwards (v', id') to its oracle and returns the answer.
 - (b) On the other hand, on input the random oracle query $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v_i = v'$ and $\text{id}_i = \text{id}'$ for some $i \in [u]$, A_{PRF} returns r_i .
4. Eventually, $A_1(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk})$ outputs $(m_1, \dots, m_u, \text{state})$.
5. For every $i \in [u]$, compute $\mathbf{h}_i$ and $\mathbf{c}_i = (D_i, \text{aux}_i)$ where $f_i(X) = r_i \oplus m_i$ and $(D_i, \mathbf{h}_i, \text{aux}_i) = \text{GenDataVDS}(\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, f_i, p)$.
6. Execute $A_2(1^\lambda, (\text{id}_i, \mathbf{h}_i, \mathbf{c}_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{state})$ and answer the incoming random oracle queries as in [Item 3](#).
7. Eventually, $A_2(1^\lambda, (\text{id}_i, \mathbf{h}_i, \mathbf{c}_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{state})$ outputs α .
8. Sample $\text{chall} \leftarrow \mathcal{C}$.
9. Execute $A_3(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk}, (\text{id}_i)_i \in [u], \text{chall}, \alpha)$, and answer the incoming queries as in [Item 3](#).
10. Finally, output whatever is returned by $A_3(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk}, (\text{id}_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{chall}, \alpha)$.

It is easy to see that, in the random oracle model, A_{PRF} correctly simulates the view of $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$. Hence, A_{PRF} retains the same advantage ϵ_{PRF} of $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$. This concludes the proof. $\square$

Lemma 11. *If Π_{MHF} is $(\epsilon_{\text{MHF}}, \sigma_{\text{MHF}}, n_{\text{MHF}})$ -secure ([Definition 1](#)) then for every valid PPT distinguisher $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ we have that*

$$\mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u) \approx_{u \cdot q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}} \mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u).$$

A distinguisher $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ is called valid if A_3 runs in parallel time σ_{MHF} with $\text{poly}(t)$ processors (as defined in [Theorem 9](#)).

Proof. Assume there exists a valid PPT distinguisher $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ that distinguishes between $\mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u)$ and $\mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u)$ with advantage greater than $u \cdot q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}$. Let $\mathbf{E}$ be the event defined as follows:

$$|\alpha| \leq n \wedge \exists i \in [u], (v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Q}_{A_3, H} \text{ such that } \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i) = v_i = v',$$

where $\mathcal{Q}_{A_3, H}$ is the set of random oracle queries submitted by A_3 and α is the memory output by A_2 . Let $\mathbf{E}_0^*$ and $\mathbf{E}_1^*$ be the events that describe $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ outputting $b = 1$ interacting with experiments $\mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u)$ and $\mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u)$, respectively. Then, the advantage of A can be rewritten as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^*] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^*]| = \\ & |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \mathbf{E}] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] + \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\neg \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \mathbf{E}] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\neg \mathbf{E}]| = \\ & \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] \cdot |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \mathbf{E}]| + \mathbb{P}[\neg \mathbf{E}] \cdot |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \neg \mathbf{E}]| > u \cdot q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}. \end{aligned}$$

We observe that $\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] = 0$ when $\neg \mathbf{E}$ occurs (this is because, conditioned to $\neg \mathbf{E}$, the hybrids $\mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u)$ and $\mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u)$ are identical). Hence, it must be that

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] \geq \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] \cdot |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \mathbf{E}]| > u \cdot q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}, \text{ i.e.,} \quad (5)$$

the probability of $\mathbf{E}$ occurring is greater than $u \cdot q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}$.

By leveraging the fact that $\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] > u \cdot q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}$, we build an adversary $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF}} = (\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},1}, \mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},2})$ that breaks the $(\epsilon_{\text{MHF}}, \sigma_{\text{MHF}}, n_{\text{MHF}})$ -security of Π_{MHF} . Recall that the validity of $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2, \mathbf{A}_3)$ guarantees $\mathbf{A}_3$ runs in parallel time σ_{MHF} with $\text{poly}(t)$ processors (as required in [Definition 1](#)). Without loss of generality, we assume that both $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},1}$ and $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},2}$ have hardcoded $\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}} \leftarrow \$ \text{Setup}_{\text{VDS}}(1^\lambda)$, $\mathbf{k} \leftarrow \$ \text{KGen}_{\text{PRF}}(1^\lambda)$, $r_i \leftarrow \$ \{0, 1\}^{d_{\text{sp}}}$ for every $i \in [u]$, $\text{chall} \leftarrow \$ \mathcal{C}$, $i^* \leftarrow \$ [u]$, $\text{id}_i \leftarrow \$ \mathcal{I}$ for every $i \in [u] \setminus \{i^*\}$, and $j^* \leftarrow \$ [q_H]$.³⁹

$\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF}} = (\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},1}, \mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},2})$ is defined as follows:

$\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},1}(1^\lambda, 1^t, \text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}^*)$: On input the security parameter 1^λ , the time parameter 1^t , the public parameters pp_{MHF} , and the input $\text{id}^* \in \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$, $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},1}$ proceeds as follows:

1. Set $\text{id}_{i^*} = \text{id}^*$.
2. For every $i \in [u]$, compute $v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$.
3. Execute $\mathbf{A}_1(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk})$ where $\text{ek} = (\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}})$ and $\text{pk} = \text{vk} = \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}$.
4. Answer the incoming random oracle queries (submitted by $\mathbf{A}_1$) as follows:
 - (a) On input the random oracle query $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v_i \neq v'$ or $\text{id}_i \neq \text{id}'$ for every $i \in [u]$, $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},1}$ returns $r' = \text{F}_{\text{PRF}}(\mathbf{k}, (v', \text{id}'))$.
 - (b) On the other hand, on input the random oracle query $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v_i = v'$ and $\text{id}_i = \text{id}'$ for some $i \in [u]$, $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},1}$ returns r_i .
5. Eventually, $\mathbf{A}_1(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk})$ outputs $(m_1, \dots, m_u, \text{state})$.
6. For every $i \in [u]$, compute $\mathbf{h}_i$ and $\mathbf{c}_i = (\mathbf{D}_i, \text{aux}_i)$ where $f_i(X) = r_i \oplus m_i$ and $(\mathbf{D}_i, \mathbf{h}_i, \text{aux}_i) = \text{GenData}_{\text{VDS}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, f_i, p)$.
7. Execute $\mathbf{A}_2(1^\lambda, (\text{id}_i, \mathbf{h}_i, \mathbf{c}_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{state})$ and answer the incoming random oracle queries (submitted by $\mathbf{A}_2$) as defined in [Item 4](#).
8. Finally, return α output by $\mathbf{A}_2(1^\lambda, (\text{id}_i, \mathbf{h}_i, \mathbf{c}_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{state})$.

$\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},2}(1^\lambda, 1^t, \text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}^*, \alpha)$: On input the security parameter 1^λ , the time parameter 1^t , the public parameters pp_{MHF} , the input $\text{id}^* \in \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$, and the pre-computed string α , $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},2}$ proceeds as follows:

1. Set $\text{id}_{i^*} = \text{id}^*$.
2. Execute $\mathbf{A}_3(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk}, (\text{id}_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{chall}, \alpha)$.
3. Answer the incoming random oracle queries (submitted by $\mathbf{A}_3$) as follows:
 - (a) On input the j -th random oracle query $(v'_j, \text{id}'_j) \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $j \neq j^*$, $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},2}$ returns $r' = \text{F}_{\text{PRF}}(\mathbf{k}, (v'_j, \text{id}'_j))$.
 - (b) On the other hand, on input the j -th random oracle query $(v'_j, \text{id}'_j) \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $j = j^*$, $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},2}$ stops and outputs v'_j .

Observe that $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF}}$ is valid with respect to the MHF experiment (see [Definition 1](#)). Indeed, $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},2}$ satisfies the following condition: $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},2}$ has the same running time of $\mathbf{A}_3$ which, in turn, runs in parallel time σ_{MHF} with $\text{poly}(t)$ processors.

Assume that $\mathbf{E}$ holds (i.e., $|\alpha| \leq n \wedge \exists i \in [u]$ and $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Q}_{\mathbf{A}_3, \text{H}}$ such that $\text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i) = v_i = v'$). First, we have that $|\alpha| \leq n \leq n_{\text{MHF}}$ as desired. Second, suppose that $\mathbf{A}_3$ queries (v_i, id') (for some id') to the random oracle during the j -th query (v'_j, id'_j) (i.e., $v'_j = v_i$). Conditioned to $\mathbf{E}$ and $j^* = j$, it is easy to see that $\mathbf{A}_{\text{MHF},2}$ correctly simulates $\mathbf{A}_3$'s view until the j^* -th oracle query. Moreover, conditioned to $\mathbf{E}$, we have that

³⁹Observe that q_H is unknown but upper-bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda)$.

- $i^* = i$ (i.e., the input $\text{id}_{i^*} = \text{id}^*$ corresponds to the i -th id_i such that $(v_i, \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Q}_{A_3, H}$ where $v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$) happens with probability $\frac{1}{u}$.
- Conditioned to $i^* = i$, $j^* = j$ (i.e., the case for which $A_{\text{MHF}, 2}$ wins against the MHF experiment) happens with probability $\frac{1}{\mathcal{Q}_{A_3, H}} \leq \frac{1}{q_H}$.

By combining Equation (5) and the above observations, we conclude that $A_{\text{MHF}} = (A_{\text{MHF}, 1}, A_{\text{MHF}, 2})$ is valid (with respect to the MHF experiment) and has an advantage of at least $\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] \cdot \frac{1}{q_H \cdot u} = \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}$. This concludes the proof. $\square$

Lemma 12. $\mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u) \approx_{\frac{u}{|\mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}|}} \mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u)$.

Proof. The only difference between these two hybrid experiments is that the challenger aborts when A_1 submits a random oracle query (v', id') such that $\text{id}_i = \text{id}'$ for some $i \in [u]$, where id_i is the i -th challenge random identifier sampled by the challenger. Since A_1 does not know the value of $\text{id}_1, \dots, \text{id}_u$ (which are only revealed to A_2) we have that A_1 submits a random oracle query (v', id') such that $\text{id}' = \text{id}_i$ (for some $i \in [u]$) with probability at most $\frac{u}{|\mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}|}$. This concludes the proof. $\square$

Lemma 13. $\mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u) \equiv \mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$.

Proof. It is easy to see that these two hybrids are identically distributed. This is because A_1 does not submit a random oracle query (v', id') such that $\text{id}' = \text{id}_i$ (for some $i \in [u]$) where id_i is the challenge random identifier sampled by the challenger (see definition of $\mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u)$). Hence, the challenger of $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$, which samples $(f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)) \leftarrow^* \mathbf{F}_{d-1, p}^u$ and programs the random oracle as $H(v_i, \text{id}_i) = H(\text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i), \text{id}_i) = r_i = f_i(X) \oplus m_i$ only after it receives $m_1, \dots, m_u$ from A_1 (as defined in $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$), is equivalent to the challenger of $\mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u)$. Moreover, since $r_i = f_i(X) \oplus m_i$ (for every $i \in [u]$), we have that the output of the encoding algorithm is correctly distributed. This is because $f_i(X) = H(\text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i), \text{id}_i) \oplus m_i = r_i \oplus m_i = f_i(X) \oplus m_i \oplus m_i = f_i(X)$. This concludes the proof. $\square$

Lemma 14. If Π_{VDS} is (ϵ_{VDS}) -sound then

$$\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u) \approx_{u \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VDS}}} \mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u).$$

Proof. Assume there exists a valid PPT distinguisher $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ that distinguishes between $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$ and $\mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u)$ with advantage greater than $u \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VDS}}$. Let $\mathbf{E}$ be the event that there exists $i \in [u]$ such that $\text{Verify}(\text{vk}, h_i, \text{chall}, \pi_i) = 1 \wedge y_i \neq f_i(\text{chall})$ where $\pi_i = (y_i, \pi'_i)$ is the proof output by A_3 . Also, let $\mathbf{E}_0^*$ and $\mathbf{E}_1^*$ be the events that $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ outputs $b = 1$ when interacting with experiments $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$ and $\mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u)$, respectively. Then, the advantage of A can be rewritten as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^*] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^*]| = \\ & |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \mathbf{E}] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] + \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\neg \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \mathbf{E}] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\neg \mathbf{E}]| = \\ & \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] \cdot |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \mathbf{E}]| + \mathbb{P}[\neg \mathbf{E}] \cdot |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \neg \mathbf{E}]| > u \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VDS}}. \end{aligned}$$

We observe that $\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] = 0$ when $\neg \mathbf{E}$ occurs (this is because, conditioned to $\neg \mathbf{E}$, the hybrids $\mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u)$ and $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$ are identical). Hence, it must be that

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] \geq \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] \cdot |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \mathbf{E}]| > u \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VDS}}, \text{ i.e.,} \quad (6)$$

the probability of $\mathbf{E}$ occurring is greater than $u \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VDS}}$.

By leveraging the fact that $\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] > u \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VDS}}$, we build an adversary A_{VDS} that breaks the (ϵ_{VDS}) -soundness of Π_{VDS} . A_{VDS} is defined as follows:

1. Sample $(f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)) \leftarrow \mathbf{F}_{d-1,p}^u$ and $i^* \leftarrow [u]$.
2. Send $f_{i^*}(X)$ to the challenger (i.e., $\mathbf{A}_{\text{VDS}}$ will play the VDS's experiment with respect to $f_{i^*}(X)$).
3. Receive $\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, D_{i^*}, h_{i^*}, \text{aux}_{i^*}$ from the challenger (computed by the challenger using $f_{i^*}(X)$).
4. For every $i \in [u]$, sample $\text{id}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$ and compute $v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$.
5. Compute $\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{MHF}}(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n)$ and $\mathbf{k} \leftarrow \text{KGen}_{\text{PRF}}(1^\lambda)$.
6. Set $\text{ek} = (\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}})$, $\text{pk} = \text{vk} = \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}$, and $\mathbf{c}_{i^*} = (D_{i^*}, \text{aux}_{i^*})$.
7. For every $i \in [u] \setminus \{i^*\}$, compute $\mathbf{h}_i$ and $\mathbf{c}_i = (D_i, \text{aux}_i)$ where $(D_i, \mathbf{h}_i, \text{aux}_i) = \text{GenData}_{\text{VDS}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, f_i, p)$.
8. Execute $\mathbf{A}_1(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk})$ and answer the incoming random oracle queries as follows:
 - (a) On input the random oracle query $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $\text{id}' \neq \text{id}_i$ for every $i \in [u]$, $\mathbf{A}_{\text{VDS}}$ returns $r' = \text{F}_{\text{PRF}}(\mathbf{k}, (v', \text{id}'))$.
 - (b) On input the random oracle query $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $\text{id}' = \text{id}_i$ for some $i \in [u]$, $\mathbf{A}_{\text{VDS}}$ aborts.
9. Eventually, $\mathbf{A}_1(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk})$ outputs $(m_1, \dots, m_u, \text{state})$.
10. For every $i \in [u]$, set $\mathbf{H}(v_i, \text{id}_i) = r_i = f_i(X) \oplus m_i$.
11. Execute $\mathbf{A}_2(1^\lambda, (\text{id}_i, \mathbf{h}_i, \mathbf{c}_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{state})$ and answer the incoming random oracle queries as follows:
 - (a) On input the random oracle query $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v' \neq v_i$ or $\text{id}' \neq \text{id}_i$ for every $i \in [u]$, $\mathbf{A}_{\text{VDS}}$ returns $r' = \text{F}_{\text{PRF}}(\mathbf{k}, (v', \text{id}'))$.
 - (b) On input the random oracle query $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v' = v_i$ and $\text{id}_i = \text{id}'$ for some $i \in [u]$, $\mathbf{A}_{\text{VDS}}$ returns r_i .
12. Eventually, $\mathbf{A}_2(1^\lambda, (\text{id}_i, \mathbf{h}_i, \mathbf{c}_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{state})$ outputs α .
13. Sample $\text{chall} \leftarrow \mathcal{C}$.
14. Execute $\mathbf{A}_3(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk}, (\text{id}_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{chall}, \alpha)$ and answer the incoming random oracle queries as follows:
 - (a) On input the random oracle query $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v' \neq v_i$ for every $i \in [u]$, $\mathbf{A}_{\text{VDS}}$ returns $r' = \text{F}_{\text{PRF}}(\mathbf{k}, (v', \text{id}'))$.
 - (b) On input the random oracle query $(v', \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v' = v_i$ for some $i \in [u]$, $\mathbf{A}_{\text{VDS}}$ aborts.
15. Finally, output $(\text{chall}, y_{i^*}, \pi'_{i^*})$ where $\pi_{i^*} = (y_{i^*}, \pi'_{i^*})$ is the i^* -th proof output of $\mathbf{A}_3(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk}, (\text{id}_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{chall}, \alpha)$.

It is easy to see that $\mathbf{A}_{\text{VDS}}$ correctly simulates the views of both $\mathbf{A}_1$, $\mathbf{A}_2$, and $\mathbf{A}_3$. Assume that $\mathbf{E}$ happens and let $i \in [u]$ be an index such that $y_i \neq f_i(\text{chall})$. Conditioned to $\mathbf{E}$ and $i^* = i$ (which happens with probability $\frac{1}{u}$), we have that $y_{i^*} \neq f_{i^*}(\text{chall})$ and $\text{Verify}(\text{vk}, h_{i^*}, \text{chall}, \pi_{i^*}) = 1$ which, in turn, implies that $\text{Verify}_{\text{VDS}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, h_{i^*}, \text{chall}, \pi'_{i^*}) = 1$. By combining Equation (6) with the observations above, we conclude that $\mathbf{A}_{\text{VDS}}$'s advantage is at least $\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] \cdot \frac{1}{u} = \epsilon_{\text{VDS}}$. This concludes the proof. $\square$

Lemma 15. $\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u) = 1] \leq \frac{d-1}{|\mathbb{Z}_q|} + \frac{1}{2^c}.$

Proof. Assume there exists a valid PPT adversary $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ such that

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u) = 1] > \frac{d-1}{|\mathbb{Z}_q|} + \frac{1}{2^c}. \quad (7)$$

Then, we build an adversary $A' = (A'_1, A'_2)$ that contradicts [Theorem 2](#). Without loss of generality, we assume that both A'_1 and A'_2 have hardcoded $(ek, pk, vk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t, 1^n)$, $k \leftarrow \text{KGen}_{\text{PRF}}(1^\lambda)$, $id_i \leftarrow \mathcal{I}$ for $i \in [u]$, where $ek = (pp_{\text{MHF}}, pp_{\text{VDS}})$ and $pk = vk = pp_{\text{VDS}}$. $A' = (A'_1, A'_2)$ is defined as follows:

$A'_1(1^\lambda, f_1, \dots, f_u)$: On input the security parameter 1^λ and u univariate polynomials $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ of degree $d-1$, A'_1 proceeds as follows:

1. For every $i \in [u]$, compute $v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(pp_{\text{MHF}}, id_i)$.
2. Execute $A_1(1^\lambda, ek, pk, vk)$ and answer to the incoming random oracle queries as follows:
 - (a) On input the random oracle query $(v', id') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $id' \neq id_i$ for every $i \in [u]$, A'_1 returns $r' = F_{\text{PRF}}(k, (v', id'))$.
 - (b) On input the random oracle query $(v', id') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $id' = id_i$ for some $i \in [u]$, A'_1 aborts.⁴⁰
3. Eventually, $A_1(1^\lambda, ek, pk, vk)$ outputs $(m_1, \dots, m_u, \text{state})$.
4. For every $i \in [u]$, set $H(v_i, id_i) = r_i = f_i(X) \oplus m_i$ and compute $(h_i, c_i) = \text{Encode}(ek, m_i, id_i)$ using the fact that $H(v_i, id_i) = r_i = f_i(X) \oplus m_i$.
5. Execute $A_2(1^\lambda, (id_i, h_i, c_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{state})$ and answer the incoming oracle queries as follows:
 - (a) On input the random oracle query $(v', id') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v' \neq v_i$ or $id' \neq id_i$ for every $i \in [u]$, A'_1 returns $r' = F_{\text{PRF}}(k, (v', id'))$.
 - (b) On input the random oracle query $(v', id') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v' = v_i$ and $id_i = id'$ for some $i \in [u]$, A'_1 returns r_i .
6. Eventually, return α which is the output of $A_2(1^\lambda, (id_i, h_i, c_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{state})$.

$A'_2(1^\lambda, x, \alpha)$: On input the security parameter 1^λ , a point $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, and a string α , A'_2 proceeds as follows:

1. Execute $A_3(1^\lambda, ek, pk, vk, (id_i)_{i \in [u]}, x, \alpha)$ and answer the incoming random oracle queries as follows:
 - (a) On input the random oracle query $(v', id') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v' \neq v_i$ for every $i \in [u]$, A'_2 returns $r' = F_{\text{PRF}}(k, (v', id'))$.
 - (b) On input the random oracle query $(v', id') \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}} \times \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}$ such that $v' = v_i$ for some $i \in [u]$, A'_2 aborts.⁴¹
2. Finally, output $(y_1, \dots, y_u)$ where $\pi_i = (y_i, \pi'_i)$ is the i -th proof output by $A_3(1^\lambda, ek, pk, vk, (id_i)_{i \in [u]}, x, \alpha)$.

⁴⁰Note that this first aborting condition is fundamental for concluding the proof correctly. This is because, at this point, A'_1 does not know $m_1, \dots, m_u$ (which are chosen by A_1). Hence, A'_1 would not be able to program the random oracle output of $H(v_i, id_i) = f_i(X) \oplus m_i$ for $i \in [u]$.

⁴¹Note that this second aborting condition is fundamental for concluding the proof correctly. This is because A'_2 can simulate A_3 's view without knowing $r_1, \dots, r_u$, $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)$, and $m_1, \dots, m_u$ which are too large to be encoded into α .

First, observe that, conditioned to $\mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u) = 1$, we have that $y_i = f_i(x)$ for every $i \in [u]$. Second, by the winning condition of the experiment, if $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2, \mathbf{A}_3)$ wins then we have α such that $|\alpha| \leq n$ and

$$n = \min\{n_{\text{MHF}}, d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c\}.$$

Hence, by combining Equation (7) and the above arguments, we conclude that $\mathbf{A}' = (\mathbf{A}'_1, \mathbf{A}'_2)$ is valid and outputs $(f_1(x), \dots, f_u(x))$ with probability greater than $\frac{d-1}{|\mathbb{Z}_q|} + \frac{1}{2^c}$. This contradicts Theorem 2 and concludes the proof. $\square$

Theorem 9 follows by combining Lemmas 10 to 15. This concludes the proof.

A.10 Proof of Corollary 6

The corollary follows by plugging Corollaries 1, 4 and 5 into Theorems 8 and 9 and Definition 19, and observing that

- under the collision resistance assumption (or the RO), there exists an $(\text{negl}(\lambda))$ -secure PRF scheme,
- $u, d \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$ thus $u \cdot q_{\text{H}} \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}, u \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VDS}}, \frac{u}{|\mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}|} = \frac{u}{2^\lambda}$ (of Theorem 9) are negligible,
- by setting s_p, s_q , and c as defined in Corollary 4 (see also the corresponding proof) then $\frac{d-1}{|\mathbb{Z}_q|} + \frac{1}{2^c} \leq O(\frac{1}{2^\lambda})$ and $d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c = d \cdot u \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta_1} - O(d \cdot \lambda) \approx u \cdot |m|$ (of Theorem 9),
- by leveraging Corollary 1 we have that $\sigma = \Omega(\ell)$ and $n_{\text{MHF}} = 0.8 \cdot \ell \cdot z$ where ℓ is the number of blocks (each of size z) of the last layer of the DRG of the underlying MHF. By setting

$$\text{either } z \geq \frac{d(u_{\max} \cdot s_p - s_q) - c}{0.8 \cdot \ell} \approx \frac{u_{\max} \cdot |m|}{0.8 \cdot \ell} \text{ or } \ell \geq \frac{d(u_{\max} \cdot s_p - s_q) - c}{0.8 \cdot z} \approx \frac{u_{\max} \cdot |m|}{0.8 \cdot z},^{42}$$

we obtain that $n_{\text{MHF}} \geq d(u_{\max} \cdot s_p - s_q) - c$. That, in turn, implies $n = \min\{n_{\text{MHF}}, d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c\}$ (of Theorem 9) equal to $d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c$ since $u \leq u_{\max}$,

- the (γ) -expansion of Construction 2 is exactly the (γ) -expansion of the underlying VDS scheme (see Theorem 7) and Construction 2 leverages polynomials of degree $d-1$ from $\mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ where p is of $s_p = \lambda^{1+\delta_1}$ bits (according to our choice of parameters); thus $\gamma = 2 \cdot d^{\delta_2} \cdot \log^{o(1)}(p) = 2 \cdot d^{\delta_2} \cdot \lambda^{o(1)(1+\delta_1)}$ for any choice of positive constant $\delta_2 > 0$.

Lastly, as for the (η) -gap, it follows by observing that $n = \min\{n_{\text{MHF}}, d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c\} = d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c$ (as defined above), $d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c = d \cdot u \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta_1} - (d+1) \cdot \lambda$ (for $s_p = \lambda^{1+\delta_1}$, $s_q = \lambda$, and $c = \lambda$ as defined in Corollary 4. See also the corresponding proof), and

$$\begin{aligned} d \cdot u \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta_1} - (d+1) \cdot \lambda &= (1-\eta)(u \cdot d \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta_1}) \implies \\ \eta &= 1 - \frac{d \cdot u \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta_1} - (d+1) \cdot \lambda}{u \cdot d \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta_1}} \implies \eta = \frac{(d+1) \cdot \lambda}{u \cdot d \cdot \lambda^{1+\delta_1}} \in O\left(\frac{1}{u \cdot \lambda^{\delta_1}}\right), \end{aligned}$$

where we used the fact that $s_p = \lambda^{1+\delta_1}$, $s_q = \lambda$, and $c = \lambda$ in Corollary 4 (see also the corresponding proof).

⁴²Note that if we set $\ell \geq \frac{d(u_{\max} \cdot s_p - s_q) - c}{0.8 \cdot z}$, we have less flexibility in tuning the time bound $\sigma = \Omega(\ell)$ which depends on ℓ .

A.11 Proof of Theorem 10

Consider the following hybrid experiments (defined in the random oracle model):

$\mathbf{H}^0(\lambda, t, n, u)$: This hybrid experiment is identical to the adaptive experiment $\mathbf{G}_{\mathbf{A}, \Pi}^{\text{replicate}}(\lambda, t, n, u)$ of PoRep.

$\mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u)$: Identical to $\mathbf{H}^0(\lambda, t, n, u)$ except that the challenger simulates the majority of the random oracle queries using the PRF scheme Π_{PRF} . More in detail, the challenger computes $\mathbf{k} \leftarrow \text{KGen}_{\text{PRF}}(1^\lambda)$ and samples the u challenge random identifier $(\text{id}_1, \dots, \text{id}_u) \leftarrow \mathcal{I}^u$ in advance. Then, on input a query $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$ for the random oracle $\mathbf{H}(\cdot)$ (recall the RO supports inputs of arbitrary polynomial size), the challenger proceeds as follows:

- Interpret w as $w = (v'_1, \dots, v'_j, \text{id}')$ (for some $j \in \mathbb{N}$) where $\text{id}' \in \mathcal{I}$ and $v'_i \in \mathcal{V}_{\text{MHF}}$ for $i \in [j]$. Also, let u the number of messages chosen by the adversary (which are known at this point) and $(\text{id}_1, \dots, \text{id}_u)$ the challenge random identifiers sampled by the challenger.
- If $j \neq u \vee \exists i \in [j], v'_i \neq v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i) \vee \forall i \in [j], \text{id}' \neq \text{id}_i$, the challenger returns $\text{F}_{\text{PRF}}(\mathbf{k}, (v'_1, \dots, v'_j, \text{id}'))$ (instead of a random value).
- Otherwise, if $j = u \wedge \forall i \in [j], v'_i = v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i) \wedge \exists i \in [j], \text{id}' = \text{id}_i$, the challenger returns a random value $r' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{d \cdot s_p}$.

$\mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u)$: Identical to $\mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u)$ except that the challenger aborts if the adversary $\mathbf{A}_3$ (i.e., the third adversary) submits a random oracle query $w = (v'_1, \dots, v'_j, \text{id}')$ such that $j = u \wedge \forall i \in [u], v'_i = v_i = \text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$, i.e., the challenger aborts if $(\text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_1), \dots, \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_u), \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Q}_{\mathbf{A}_3, \mathbf{H}}$ (for some id') where $\mathcal{Q}_{\mathbf{A}_3, \mathbf{H}}$ is the set of random oracle queries submitted by $\mathbf{A}_3$ and id_i is the i -th challenge random identifier which is sampled at random from $\mathcal{I}$.⁴³ Observe that if $\mathbf{A}_1$ and $\mathbf{A}_2$ submit $(\text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_1), \dots, \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_u), \text{id}')$ (for some id') to the random oracle, the challenger does not abort.

$\mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u)$: Identical to $\mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u)$ except that the challenger aborts if the adversary $\mathbf{A}_1$ (i.e., the first adversary) submits the random oracle query $w = (v'_1, \dots, v'_j, \text{id}')$ (for some $j \in \mathbb{N}$) such that $\text{id}' = \text{id}_i$ for some $i \in [u]$, i.e., the challenger aborts if $w = (v'_1, \dots, v'_j, \text{id}_i) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{H}}$ (for some $(v'_1, \dots, v'_j)$ and $i \in [u]$) where $\mathcal{Q}_{\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{H}}$ is the set of random oracle queries submitted by $\mathbf{A}_1$ and id_i is the i -th challenge random identifier which is sampled at random from $\mathcal{I}$ in advance.

$\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$: Identical to $\mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u)$ except that the challenger changes its strategy for computing $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)$ and answering to the random oracle queries $w = (v'_1, \dots, v'_j, \text{id}')$ such that $j = u \wedge \forall i \in [u], v'_i = v_i = \text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i) \wedge \exists i \in [j], \text{id}' = \text{id}_i$, where id_i is the i -th challenge random identifier. More formally, let $\mathbf{F}_{d-1, p}^u$ (where p is a $(s_p + 1)$ -bits prime) be a distribution over univariate polynomials of degree $d - 1$ from $\mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ that samples u polynomials $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ as follows:

1. Sample $(a_0, \dots, a_{u \cdot d - 1}) \leftarrow \mathbf{U}_{u \cdot d \cdot s_p}$.
2. Return u univariate polynomials $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)$ such that $f_j(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} a_{j \cdot d + i} \cdot X^i$ for every $j \in [u - 1] \cup \{0\}$ (i.e., each binary string a_i is interpreted as an element of $\mathbb{Z}_p$).

The challenger proceeds as follows:

⁴³When the challenger decides to abort, the experiment continues as usual but the final outcome is set to 0.

- The challenger samples $(\text{id}_1, \dots, \text{id}_u) \leftarrow \mathcal{I}^u$ and $(f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)) \leftarrow \mathbf{F}_{d-1,p}^u$.
- The challenger starts the experiment $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$.
- When $A_1(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk})$ outputs $(m_1, \dots, m_u, \beta)$, the challenger runs $v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i)$ and sets $H(v_1, \dots, v_u, \text{id}_i) = r_i = f_i(X) \oplus m_i$ for every $i \in [u]$.
- Then, the challenger continues the execution of $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$ which is identical to $\mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u)$ except that the challenger will use $f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)$ and $H(v_1, \dots, v_u, \text{id}_1), \dots, H(v_1, \dots, v_u, \text{id}_u)$ programmed as described defined above.

$\mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u)$: Identical to $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$ except that the outcome of the experiment $\mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u)$ is set to 0 if there exists $i \in [u]$ such that $y_i \neq f_i(\text{chall})$ where $\pi_i = (y_i, \pi'_i)$ is the i -th proof output by the adversary A_3 .

Lemma 16. *If Π_{PRF} is (ϵ_{PRF}) -secure then*

$$\mathbf{H}^0(\lambda, t, n, u) \approx_{\epsilon_{\text{PRF}}} \mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u).$$

Proof. The proof of Lemma 16 is similar to that of Lemma 10, so we omit it. $\square$

Lemma 17. *If Π_{MHF} is $(\epsilon_{\text{MHF}}, \sigma_{\text{MHF}}, n_{\text{MHF}})$ -secure (Definition 2) then for every valid PPT distinguisher $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ we have that*

$$\mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u) \approx_{q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}} \mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u).$$

A distinguisher $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ is called valid if A_3 runs in parallel time σ_{MHF} with $\text{poly}(t)$ processors (as defined in Theorem 10).

Proof. Assume there exists a valid PPT distinguisher $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ that distinguishes between $\mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u)$ and $\mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u)$ with advantage greater than $q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}$. Let $\mathbf{E}$ be the event defined as follows:

$$|\alpha| \leq n \wedge \exists (v'_1, \dots, v'_j, \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Q}_{A_3, H} \text{ such that } j = u \wedge \forall i \in [u], \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i) = v_i = v'_i,$$

where $\mathcal{Q}_{A_3, H}$ is the set of random oracle queries submitted by A_3 and α is the memory computed by A_2 . Also, let $\mathbf{E}_0^*$ and $\mathbf{E}_1^*$ be the events that describe $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ outputting $b = 1$ when interacting with experiments $\mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u)$ and $\mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u)$, respectively. Then, the advantage of A can be rewritten as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^*] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^*]| = \\ & |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \mathbf{E}] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] + \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\neg \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \mathbf{E}] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] \cdot \mathbb{P}[\neg \mathbf{E}]| = \\ & \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] \cdot |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \mathbf{E}]| + \mathbb{P}[\neg \mathbf{E}] \cdot |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \neg \mathbf{E}]| > q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}. \end{aligned}$$

We observe that $\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \neg \mathbf{E}] = 0$ when $\neg \mathbf{E}$ occurs (this is because, conditioned to $\neg \mathbf{E}$, the hybrids $\mathbf{H}^1(\lambda, t, n, u)$ and $\mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u)$ are identical). Hence, it must be that

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] \geq \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] \cdot |\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_0^* | \mathbf{E}] - \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}_1^* | \mathbf{E}]| > q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}, \text{ i.e.,} \quad (8)$$

the probability of $\mathbf{E}$ occurring is greater than $q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}$.

By leveraging the fact that $\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] > q_H \cdot \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}$, we build an adversary $A_{\text{MHF}} = (A_{\text{MHF},1}, A_{\text{MHF},2})$ that breaks the $(\epsilon_{\text{MHF}}, \sigma_{\text{MHF}}, n_{\text{MHF}})$ -parallel-security of the non-amortizable MHF Π_{MHF} . Recall that the validity of $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ guarantees A_3 runs in parallel time σ_{MHF} with $\text{poly}(t)$ processors (as required in Definition 2). Without loss of generality, we assume that both $A_{\text{MHF},1}$

and $A_{\text{MHF},2}$ have hardcoded $\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}} \leftarrow \$ \text{Setup}_{\text{VDS}}(1^\lambda)$, $k \leftarrow \$ \text{KGen}_{\text{PRF}}(1^\lambda)$, $r_i \leftarrow \$ \{0,1\}^{d \cdot s_p}$ for every $i \in [u]$, $\text{chall} \leftarrow \$ \mathcal{C}$, and $i^* \leftarrow \$ [q_H]$.⁴⁴

$A_{\text{MHF}} = (A_{\text{MHF},1}, A_{\text{MHF},2})$ is defined as follows:

$A_{\text{MHF},1}(1^\lambda, 1^t, \text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, (\text{id}_1^*, \dots, \text{id}_u^*))$: On input the security parameter 1^λ , the time parameter 1^t , the public parameter pp_{MHF} , and u inputs $(\text{id}_1^*, \dots, \text{id}_u^*) \in \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}^u$, $A_{\text{MHF},1}$ proceeds as follows:

1. For every $i \in [u]$, compute $v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i^*)$.
2. Execute $A_1(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk})$ where $\text{ek} = (\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}})$ and $\text{pk} = \text{vk} = \text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}$.
3. Answer the incoming random oracle queries (submitted by A_1) as follows:
 - (a) On input the random oracle query $w \in \{0,1\}^*$, interpret $w = (v'_i, \dots, v'_j, \text{id}')$ (for some $j \in \mathbb{N}$) where $\text{id}' \in \mathcal{I}$ and $v'_i \in \mathcal{Y}_{\text{MHF}}$ for $i \in [j]$.
 - (b) If $j \neq u \vee \exists i \in [j], v'_i \neq v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i^*) \vee \forall i \in [j], \text{id}' \neq \text{id}_i^*$, $A_{\text{MHF},2}$ returns $F_{\text{PRF}}(k, (v'_1, \dots, v'_j, \text{id}'))$.
 - (c) Otherwise, if $j = u \wedge \forall i \in [j], v'_i = v_i = \text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i^*) \wedge \exists i \in [j], \text{id}' = \text{id}_i^*$, $A_{\text{MHF},2}$ returns r_i .
4. Eventually, $A_1(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk})$ outputs $(m_1, \dots, m_u, \text{state})$.
5. For every $i \in [u]$, compute h_i and $c_i = (D_i, \text{aux}_i)$ where $f_i(X) = r_i \oplus m_i$ and $(D_i, h_i, \text{aux}_i) = \text{GenData}_{\text{VDS}}(\text{pp}_{\text{VDS}}, f_i, p)$.
6. Execute $A_2(1^\lambda, (\text{id}_i, h_i, c_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{state})$ and answer the incoming random oracle queries (submitted by A_2) as defined in [Item 3](#).
7. Finally, return α output by $A_2(1^\lambda, (\text{id}_i, h_i, c_i)_{i \in [u]}, \text{state})$.

$A_{\text{MHF},2}(1^\lambda, 1^t, \text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, (\text{id}_1^*, \dots, \text{id}_u^*), \alpha)$: On input the security parameter 1^λ , the time parameter 1^t , the public parameters pp_{MHF} , the u inputs $(\text{id}_1^*, \dots, \text{id}_u^*) \in \mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}^*$, and the pre-computed string α , $A_{\text{MHF},2}$ proceeds as follows:

1. Execute $A_3(1^\lambda, \text{ek}, \text{pk}, \text{vk}, (\text{id}_i^*)_{i \in [u]}, \text{chall}, \alpha)$.
2. Answer the incoming random oracle queries (submitted by A_3) as follows:
 - (a) On input the i -th random oracle query w_i , interpret $w_i = (v'_{1,i}, \dots, v'_{j,i}, \text{id}'_j)$ (for some $j \in \mathbb{N}$).
 - (b) If $i \neq i^*$, $A_{\text{MHF},3}$ returns $r' = F_{\text{PRF}}(k, (v'_{1,i}, \dots, v'_{j,i}, \text{id}'_j))$.
 - (c) If $i = i^*$, $A_{\text{MHF},3}$ stops and outputs $(v'_{1,i}, \dots, v'_{j,i})$.

Observe that A_{MHF} is valid with respect to the MHF experiment (see [Definition 2](#)) since $A_{\text{MHF},2}$ has the same running time of A_3 which, in turn, runs in parallel time σ_{MHF} with $\text{poly}(t)$ processors.

Assume that $\mathbf{E}$ holds (i.e., $|\alpha| \leq n \wedge \exists (v'_1, \dots, v'_j, \text{id}') \in \mathcal{Q}_{A_3, H}$ such that $\text{Eval}_{\text{MHF}}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_i) = v_i = v'_i$ for every $i \in [u]$). First, we have $|\alpha| \leq n \leq n_{\text{MHF}}$ as desired. Second, suppose that A_3 queries $(v_1, \dots, v_u, \text{id}')$ (for some id') to the random oracle during the i -th query $w_i = (v'_{1,i}, \dots, v'_{u,i}, \text{id}'_i)$ (i.e., $(v'_{1,i}, \dots, v'_{u,i}) = (v_1, \dots, v_u)$). Conditioned to $\mathbf{E}$ and $i^* = i$, it is easy to see that $A_{\text{MHF},2}$ correctly simulates A_3 's view until the i^* -th oracle query. Moreover, conditioned to $\mathbf{E}$, we have that $i^* = i$ (i.e., the case for which $A_{\text{MHF},2}$ wins against the MHF experiment) happens with probability $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{Q}_{A_3, H}|} \leq \frac{1}{q_H}$. By combining [Equation \(8\)](#) and the above observations, we conclude that $A_{\text{MHF}} = (A_{\text{MHF},1}, A_{\text{MHF},2})$ is valid (with respect to the non-amortizable MHF experiment) and has an advantage of at least $\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{E}] \cdot \frac{1}{q_H} = \epsilon_{\text{MHF}}$. This concludes the proof. $\square$

⁴⁴Observe that q_H is unknown but upper-bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda)$.

Lemma 18. $\mathbf{H}^2(\lambda, t, n, u) \approx_{\frac{u}{|\mathcal{X}_{\text{MHF}}|}} \mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u)$.

Proof. The proof of Lemma 18 is identical to that of Lemma 12, so we omit it. $\square$

Lemma 19. $\mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u) \equiv \mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$.

Proof. It is easy to see that these two hybrids are identically distributed. This is because A_1 does not submit a random oracle query $w = (v'_1, \dots, v'_j, \text{id}')$ (for some $j \in \mathbb{N}$) such that $\text{id}' = \text{id}_i$ (for some $i \in [u]$) where id_i is the challenge random identifier sampled by the challenger. Hence, the challenger of $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$, which samples $(f_1(X), \dots, f_u(X)) \leftarrow \mathbf{F}_{d-1,p}^u$ and, for every $i \in [u]$, it programs the random oracle as $\mathbf{H}(v_1, \dots, v_u, \text{id}_i) = \mathbf{H}(\text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_1), \dots, \text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_u), \text{id}_i) = r_i = f_i(X) \oplus m_i$ only after it receives $m_1, \dots, m_u$ from A_1 (as defined in $\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u)$), is equivalent to the challenger of $\mathbf{H}^3(\lambda, t, n, u)$. Moreover, since $r_i = f_i(X) \oplus m_i$ (for every $i \in [u]$), we have that the output of the encoding algorithm is correctly distributed. This is because $f_i(X) = \mathbf{H}(\text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_1), \dots, \text{Eval}(\text{pp}_{\text{MHF}}, \text{id}_u), \text{id}_i) \oplus m_i = r_i \oplus m_i = f_i(X) \oplus m_i \oplus m_i = f_i(X)$. This concludes the proof. $\square$

Lemma 20. If Π_{VDS} is (ϵ_{VDS}) -sound then

$$\mathbf{H}^4(\lambda, t, n, u) \approx_{u \cdot \epsilon_{\text{VDS}}} \mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u).$$

Proof. The proof of Lemma 20 is similar to that of Lemma 14, so we omit it. $\square$

Lemma 21. $\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{H}^5(\lambda, t, n, u) = 1] \leq \frac{d-1}{|\mathbb{Z}_q|} + \frac{1}{2^c}$.

Proof. The proof of Lemma 21 is similar to that of Lemma 15, so we omit it. $\square$

Theorem 10 follows by combining Lemmas 16 to 21. This concludes the proof.

A.12 Proof of Corollary 7

The proof is similar to that of Corollary 6 (Appendix A.10). The only difference is that we set

$$\text{either } z \geq \frac{d \cdot s_p}{0.8 \cdot \ell} = \frac{|m|}{0.8 \cdot \ell} \text{ or } \ell \geq \frac{d \cdot s_p}{0.8 \cdot z} = \frac{|m|}{0.8 \cdot z},$$

to obtain $u \cdot n_{\text{MHF}} \geq d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c$ which, in turn, implies $n = \min\{u \cdot n_{\text{MHF}}, d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c\} = d(u \cdot s_p - s_q) - c$. The rest of the proof is identical.